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ABSTRACT 
Existing military microgrid analysis tools lack an integrated system analysis 
process to fully assess energy resilience and microgrid cost. This capstone describes the 
development of a common streamlined tool and methodology to improve the ability to 
assess energy resilience for military microgrids using event scenarios including deliberate 
attacks and natural disasters. The resilience metric used in this report, defined as the 
expected lifecycle mission impact (ELMI), quantifies microgrid resilience in terms of the 
microgrid’s ability to minimize mission impact against all potential threats to power 
disruption. The tool considers a realistic set of scenarios that could disrupt power 
allowing users to compare distributed energy resource (DER) changes against a single 
microgrid architecture to determine the best balance between cost and resilience. Users 
can configure the tool to allow for change in microgrid load or updates to 
equipment costs. A supplemental user’s guide provides a thorough walkthrough of 
the tool, and a supplemental case study demonstrates the tool functionality by 
analyzing an existing naval installation microgrid. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Existing design and analysis tools related to military microgrids lack an integrated 
system design and analysis process. Currently multiple analyses are conducted separate 
from one another. The purpose of the Microgrid Systems Engineering Team (MSET) 
capstone is to integrate electrical engineering (EE) and systems engineering (SE) microgrid 
efforts into a single cohesive and easy to use Microsoft Excel tool to provide base energy 
mangers an integrated system design methodology to quickly assess microgrid trade-offs 
between resilience, cost, and distributed energy resources (DER). The MSET project scope 
is limited to the integration of existing microgrid tools and models that are freely accessible 
and focuses on three main topics valued by the stakeholders: resilience, electrical 
architecture, and cost. Microsoft Excel and freely available existing analysis tools were 
chosen over closed-source tools and other programming languages so the integrated MSET 
tool can be easily accessible to and usable by the end users (naval base energy managers). 
The MSET tool integrates Oriti’s [1] power flow model, Anderson’s [2] stochastic 
resilience model, Hildebrand’s [3] cost model, and Peterson’s [4] resilience metric— 
Expected Life cycle Mission Impact (ELMI)—to develop a cohesive tool and methodology 
for base energy managers to design a microgrid. Oriti’s [1] power flow model is intended 
to correctly size DERs to support a critical load; the power flow graph illustrates how the 
microgrid components produce power to meet the load demand. Anderson’s [2] resilience 
model introduces stochastic modeling to simulate a power disruption event to assess and 
quantify the resilience of a microgrid system based on invulnerability and recoverability. 
A simplified version of Anderson’s [2] cost model is used to incorporate the operation and 
maintenance costs of differing levels of maintenance. Hildebrand’s [3] cost model uses the 
net present value (NPV) and the ELMI resilience calculation developed by Peterson [4] to 
calculate the life cycle cost of a system. The MSET tool is meant to provide insight into 
trends of cost, resilience, and DER ratings, and is not meant to provide absolute answers 
or actual cost quotes. The tool is designed for a single architecture with one photovoltaic 
array, one battery energy storage system, and one diesel generator expected to support a 
single critical load. Utilizing a single architecture simplifies the initial analysis of the 
xvi 
microgrid by allowing the user to observe the changes in cost and resilience per type of 
DER.   
During the process of testing and execution of the case study, limitations were 
discovered. The solar irradiance data within the model is set for Spain and is difficult to 
change. Due to the low granularity of the available cost data in the MSET tool, small 
changes in DER ratings are not easily represented in the NPV outputs. Additionally, the 
DER ratings that are correctly sized for the power flow are not suitable for analysis in the 
“Trade-off Analysis” tab within the Excel tool due to the way the resilience is simulated. 
The tradeoff analysis configurations are limited to DER sizing that is 50% greater than the 
average load. Resilience metrics and trends are accurate for DER ratings that fall within 
1.5x the average load; however, DERs that are significantly larger encounter difficulty with 
the way resilience is calculated within the models incorporated in the MSET tool. Another 
limitation to the MSET tool is the inability to simulate load shedding—the energy 
management feature that identifies and prioritizes critical and non-critical loads. The 
aforementioned limitations are good candidates for future improvements to the MSET tool.    
The MSET tool provides capabilities not previously available to base energy 
managers. Prior to the development of the MSET tool, an open source and free tool that 
takes into account factors that are important to DOD, such as resilience, did not exist. The 
MSET tool provides initial insight which can focus further analyses and funding. The 
MSET tool allows the user to choose four different DER rating combinations for a single 
disruptive event. Although the ELMI resilience metric takes into consideration four 
disruptive events from the resilience model, the MSET tool reduced the scale of the 
calculation to consider the mission impact for a single disruptive event.  
Preliminary analysis conducted with the MSET tool indicates that in general, 
increasing the DG rating provided the greatest increase in resilience versus return on 
investment if fuel availability is not constrained. A DG can provide more power at a lower 
procurement and operation and maintenance cost than either a photovoltaic or a battery 
energy storage system (BESS). Analysis conducted during the capstone indicates that it 
may be possible to further improve the resilience for the DG by increasing the maintenance 
level up to the supplier’s recommended maintenance level; however, these gains are 
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minimal and should be heavily examined in light of cost constraints. Increases to the BESS 
sizing (e.g.: increased BESS capacity) provide the worst return on investment with a 
minimal resilience impact at extremely high cost per MSET tool analysis.  
The MSET tool is intended to provide the end user the ability to compare and 
modify military microgrid configurations based on user requirements and restrictions to 
meet each user’s specific circumstance. Several areas of future work have been identified 
to further improve and integrate analyses that are important to military microgrids. For 
instance, the tool should be reworked into a more efficient coding language (e.g.: Python) 
that is better equipped than Excel at running Monte Carlo simulations in terms of 
computational efficiency. Based on discussions with several commands, Python is quickly 
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A properly constructed microgrid can address the energy security needs of the 
Department of Defense (DOD) by providing power to critical loads during periods where 
power from external utilities is disrupted. Previous research and existing tools for 
microgrid design and assessment address specific aspects of microgrid design and 
assessment but do not fully assess energy resilience in a context relevant to the DOD. This 
chapter discusses the problem under consideration and the purpose of this technical report. 
The background section provides an overview of power generation, energy storage, power 
distribution, and system control. Chapter I also includes the concept of operations 
(CONOPS), the scope of the technical report, and a stakeholder analysis.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) is required to “ensure the readiness of the 
armed forces for their military missions by pursuing energy security and energy resilience” 
[1]. Additionally, the SECDEF has authorized the use of energy resilience and energy 
security factors to drive cost-benefit analysis for energy procurement, and to favorably 
consider “projects that will use renewable energy sources to provide power to military 
facilities or to an installation’s electrical grid. Consequently, all military microgrid 
decisions must consider trade-offs between energy security and the cost of the energy” [2].  
A variety of commercial and academic tools exist in literature and are commercially 
available to understand civilian microgrid infrastructure from the perspectives of 
reliability, economics, resilience, and other important “ilities.” However, existing design 
and analysis tools related to military microgrids lack an integrated system design and 
analysis process. Base energy managers lack a cohesive methodology or toolset to assess 
energy resilience, security, or needs without cobbling together tools or modifying 
commercially available software for DOD purposes.  
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B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of the Microgrid Systems Engineering Team (MSET) capstone is to 
integrate electrical engineering (EE) and systems engineering (SE) microgrid efforts into a 
single cohesive and easy to use Microsoft Excel tool to provide base energy mangers an 
integrated system design methodology to quickly assess microgrid tradeoffs. Integrating 
both EE and SE efforts merges key pieces of information synthesized by multiple diverse 
studies, ensuring each discipline will be able to concentrate on their own domain while 
using beneficial inputs from the other, creating a synergistic effect. Thus far, EE efforts 
approached microgrids from a power flow perspective while SE efforts approached 
microgrids from a resilience and cost perspective. This capstone seeks to reduce rework 
performed by end users who currently manually integrate tools and methodologies to 
perform assessments. The team develops a more streamlined and comprehensive process 
based off prior EE and SE research enabling the base energy managers to assess the 
resilience and trade-offs of microgrids on military installations. 
C. BACKGROUND 
The U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) defines microgrids as “a group of 
interconnected loads and distributed energy resources (DERs) within clearly defined electrical 
boundaries that acts as a single controllable entity with respect to the grid” [2]. “A microgrid 
can connect and disconnect from the grid to enable it to operate in both grid-connected or [grid-
disconnected] island mode” [3]. The early 2000s established the concept of a modern microgrid 
as a power system served by utility power that can continue to provide power in island mode 
operation using DERs [4], [5]. DOD policy and objectives were established to define goals for 
the percentage of renewable power and encourage its increased usage as well as ensure the 
armed forces address energy security and resilience [1]. 
Energy security is critical to address for naval installations due to the strategic 
importance of loads. National security necessitates that bases continue to meet mission 
requirements under degraded energy conditions; energy security is typically characterized 
by the “ability to supply critical loads reliably, indefinitely, economically, and in an 
environmentally friendly manner (sustainably), which enables full-time mission support” 
3 
[6]. Because many DOD functions and activities are reliant on the ready availability of 
energy, “the issue of energy security must be addressed in a systematic and systemic way 
to assure mission accomplishment” [2]. There are two categories of functions that require 
readily available energy on a naval installation—critical functions defined as necessary to 
support the installation’s mission and non-critical functions defined as any loads that are 
not considered critical. Installations may designate critical functions differently based on 
their intended mission sets.  
For naval installations, the Naval Facilities (NAVFAC) generally controls the base 
microgrid, which is capable of functioning whether connected to an external power 
provider. A microgrid can operate while connected (grid-connected mode) to, or 
disconnected (island-mode) from the external (civilian) utility grid [3]. In grid-connected 
mode, if the power demand of the installation load is high, the microgrid draws power from 
the public utility grid to fulfill demand. In contrast, if power demand of the loads is low, 
the microgrid may supply surplus power to the utility grid, may store surplus energy in on-
site energy storage systems, or may curtail local energy production to match demand. In 
the event of an emergency or disruption due to natural disaster, power shortage (e.g., rolling 
blackout, public safety power shutoff, etc.), or an adversary attack, the microgrid can 
transition to island-mode. “In island mode, the microgrid is isolated from the local utility 
and assumes responsibility for actively maintaining microgrid voltage and frequency 
within agreed upon ranges” [2].  
The DOD has a vested interest in improving energy security; one of these measures 
being to strengthen electrical power system resiliency against natural disturbances, faults, 
or deliberate attacks [7]. DOD facilities can utilize microgrids to improve resilience as they 
mitigate the effects of power interruptions as well as improve “the ability to continue to 
meet critical electrical loads when utility power is lost” [8].  
This technical report focuses on the island-mode of a military microgrid to properly 
perform a utility independent assessment. In order to operate successfully in island-mode, 
the microgrid system generates power, stores energy, distributes power, and performs 
control functions [2]. Each of the functions is elaborated upon in the following Chapters 
I.B.1 - I.B.4. 
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1. Power Generation 
The majority of microgrids contain one or more DER; local energy generation 
sources often take form as conventional fossil fueled generators, alternative fueled 
generators, or renewable energy sources [2]. When the external grid connection is 
disrupted, grid-connected military microgrids rely heavily on diesel generators (DGs) with 
the addition of photovoltaic (PV) systems as a source of renewable power. PV systems 
utilize the sun to generate power but are ineffective generation sources during periods of 
darkness or during periods of inconsistent sunlight. This report will include DGs as the 
most prevalent and consistent backup power generation source and PVs as a common 
renewable generator. The PV element in the system can be considered a relevant 
placeholder for any assortment of alternative power generation options available to a site 
energy manager, selected based on location.  
2. Energy Storage 
The integration of multiple power sources within a microgrid provides greater 
redundancy to ensure missions and operations are uninterrupted. However, power 
generation is not the only issue of concern. The operation of DGs depend on a steady fuel 
supply, and PV operation is highly impacted by solar irradiance, which is not always 
consistent. As a result, there is a need to store energy during peak power generation so it 
can be used when the power generators are unable to meet the load demand. Many options 
are available for energy storage. Most recently, alternative energy storage system (ESS) 
technologies such as thermal, kinetic, and gravity based ESSs have been developed [9], 
[10]; however, many are still new and yet unproven. The most common ESS used in the 
military today are chemical batteries. This choice is primarily due to the DOD’s interest in 
demonstrated, reliable technology, especially for the purpose of maintaining energy 
security [11]. 
3. Power Distribution 
Power distribution is accomplished through electrical transmission lines and 
electrical buses. Alternating current (AC) “energy transmission is generally used when 
there are longer distances between nodes in the microgrid network. Direct current (DC) 
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energy transmission is often found in specialized microgrid applications such as computer 
server farms or facilities with large quantities of sensitive electronics.” [2]. As AC energy 
is generated and distributed across the network, transformers are used to “step up” or “step 
down” voltage levels to convert AC energy to the required voltage. Switches and breakers 
are also necessary so loads can be energized and de-energized depending on the system’s 
status. DER and battery ESS also require the use of power electronic devices, or power 
converters to convert voltages from AC to DC, DC to AC or DC to higher or lower DC 
voltages. 
a. System Control 
Microgrid system control (or energy management system) is accomplished through 
a controller that can command the DER and ESS. Microgrid controller logic is outside the 
scope of this report and the number of controllers will not be considered. The controller 
will dictate how much power is generated by the DGs and/or DER as well as the flow of 
power into and out of the ESS. The controller can generally also sense when utility grid 
power is lost, and often automatically sheds any non-critical loads. Load shedding is done 
through the control logic for the system controller, which dictates what loads are supported 
in island-mode (critical loads) and what loads may be optionally supported (non-critical 
loads). 
To assess installation requirements, the base microgrid must identify and separate 
the non-critical loads, which enables the microgrid to keep critical loads online during a 
destabilizing event. Ideally, the separation of critical and non-critical loads is desired; 
however, not all base microgrids are configured this way. Base energy managers must be 
able to correctly identify the critical installation loads. This report assumes that non-critical 
loads have been identified and can be separated from the power supply during periods of 
excess demand. 
D. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS  
This section differentiates between the CONOPS for a generic microgrid required 
for background knowledge and the CONOPS for the MSET tool that was developed as part 
6 
of this technical report. The CONOPS for both general microgrids and the MSET tool serve 
as the fundamental foundation on which the tool is developed.  
1. Microgrid CONOPS 
A microgrid is defined as a power generation and distribution system capable of 
working while either connected to or disconnected from the external utility grid. For this report, 
it is assumed that the microgrid under assessment is configured, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Basic Microgrid Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 
The microgrid CONOPS addresses interactions for basic components and entities 
for a simplified microgrid. The intent is to provide the general characteristics and 
relationships for a general overview. The smaller internal black box is the boundary for the 
microgrid on the naval installation. Under normal conditions, military installation 
7 
microgrids are powered by an external utility grid which provides the power to the naval 
installation. At this time, the PV array and/or DGs keep the batteries charged as backups, 
but they do not carry loads. When the control station senses an external utility grid 
disruption, island mode is initiated in which all loads on the base microgrid are shifted to 
be carried by the DER sources on base. 
When in island mode, if the power demand exceeds the power supply, the non-
critical loads are shed so the available DER can continue to support the critical loads. If 
the microgrid and the control logic are designed properly, the critical loads will remain 
powered for the required period of autonomy.  
2. MSET Tool CONOPS 
Several commercial and academic microgrid assessment tools currently exist. Navy 
Shore Energy Technology Transition and Integration (NSETTI) has funded NPS to design 
several microgrid analysis tools and methodologies. The NSETTI tools were developed to 
assist with PV and battery sizing with variables for solar irradiance, PV loss due to weather, 
duration of outages, and DER backups. NSETTI continues to collaborate with NPS to 
develop tools to calculate microgrid resilience, resilience cost analysis, and evaluating 
recovery actions, which dovetail nicely with previous tools developed as part of the 
NSETTI project.  
The tool developed by MSET provides a single interface that integrates several 
previously developed SE and EE tools (largely through the NSETTI Project) to assess 
microgrid designs more easily for specific conditions. Base energy mangers are the 
intended users as they are responsible for the supply and support of power to the command 
installation. The base energy manager user provides the MSET tool the necessary inputs in 
the requested format. These inputs will be fed into the various SE and EE tools developed 
to date and will produce their respective results and recommendations, which will be 
simplified and consolidated in the MSET tool outputs.  
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E. SCOPE 
The MSET project scope is limited to the integration of other existing microgrid 
tools and models that are freely accessible. During the literature review, it was decided to 
avoid the use of any tool sets that required licensing or special software. Given those 
limitations, MSET determined certain research efforts were more aligned with MSET’s 
intended direction. Through the integration of different engineering disciplines, the tool is 
intended to provide sufficient information to the base energy manager (the end user) to 
allow them to determine the best configuration balance and trade-off for their installation 
and situation. Figure 2 is the context diagram developed by MSET for this work.  
 
Figure 2. Context Diagram of the MSET Tool 
MSET expected to iteratively expand the scope of the project to gather the 
necessary information and to close deficiencies discovered during tool creation. MSET’s 
scope is bounded to the integration of existing research and toolsets; any deficiencies left 
unresolved, missing tools, or dead ends discovered during development will be 
documented and discussed in future work. 
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F. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
NPS has collaborated with stakeholders to develop several analysis tools and 
methodologies to assess electrical engineering and resilience analyses of microgrids. This 
report outlines and details the process and analysis for the development of the MSET tool 
developed as an NPS Systems Engineering Department capstone project. Stakeholders 
include those that have an interest in using the integrated tool and/or funding the 
development of this project. Stakeholder analysis was performed with the capstone 
advisors to determine how previous work, knowledge base, and high-level interest/needs 
tie into the overall goals of this project. This information was used to develop and refine 
the purpose, scope, requirements, and end results of this report. Top level SE diagrams 
were produced and presented to project advisors to ensure MSET developed a microgrid 
resilience analysis tool that was in line with stakeholder requirements and needs. Table 1 
lists the different stakeholders interested in the microgrid.  
Table 1. Stakeholder Categorization 
Microgrid Stakeholders 
Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Facilities / Personnel Electrical Utility Installers 
Facilities Managers Supply System / Personnel Equipment Manufacturers 
Utilities Managers Maintenance Activities Surrounding Community 
Owner   
 
Stakeholders are broken into three different categories: primary, secondary, and 
tertiary. Primary stakeholders have the greatest interest and direct usage of the MSET tool 
while secondary and tertiary stakeholders are expected to be affected by decisions. The 
primary stakeholders include the personnel within the installation that receive power from 
the microgrid system and are responsible for determining the mission and load criticality 
of contributing system, the facilities and utility managers responsible for the infrastructure 
within the installation to include acquisition and sustainment serving the needs of functions 
performed at the installation; and the owner of the microgrid who is funding the microgrid 
[12].  
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Secondary stakeholders include the local utility provider, supply system/personnel 
and maintenance personnel and systems, these stakeholders determine integration 
boundary constraints such as physical coupling, “power supply limitations, power quality, 
disconnection and reconnection parameters, and ability and limitations on exporting excess 
power back to the utility grid” [12]. Maintenance personnel and supply systems will 
determine supportability limitations such as availability of spares, timeline and ability to 
perform inspections, maintenance, diagnostics and repairs [13].  
The tertiary stakeholders such as equipment manufacturers, installers, and the 
surrounding community are loosely interested in the system because it provides a source 
of revenue. Each military installation with an operational or developmental microgrid has 
different stakeholders that install, manage, and maintain the microgrid, or in the case of the 
surrounding community may be impacted in some manner due to power interdependencies. 
The equipment manufacturer and installers are heavily involved in the initial acquisition 
and implementation and will be involved in providing interface data and determine 
interoperability between systems and may continue their involvement to provide updates, 
support maintenance, repairs, and other activities through the duration of the microgrid life 
cycle [12].  
The MSET tool has four primary and two secondary stakeholders. Table 2 lists the 
stakeholders interested in the tool MSET has developed.  
Table 2. MSET Tool Stakeholders Categories 
MSET Tool Stakeholders 
Primary Secondary 
Dr. Van Bossuyt NSETTI Project Team 
Dr. Oriti NAVFAC EXWC 
Dr. Giachetti  
Energy Managers  
 
Based on the scope of the capstone project, MSET interacted primarily with the 
advisor Dr. Douglas Van Bossuyt, and co-advisor Dr. Giovanna Oriti. Dr. Ronald 
Giachetti, System Engineering Department Chair, is a microgrid systems engineering 
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subject matter expert as well as a primary stakeholder. The intended user of the MSET tool 
is the base energy manager, who is the main primary stakeholder; however, MSET does 
not have direct contact with an energy manage. Secondary stakeholders are the NSETTI 
project team, who are interested in the outcome of the toolset for further study. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter presents relevant work produced by a variety of sources that have a 
significant impact in the overall MSET purpose. In literature reviews performed by MSET, 
a variety of resilience definitions, methods, and aspects were discussed. Chapter II.A 
covers resilience definitions and metrics; Chapter II.B covers the electrical architecture of 
microgrids; Chapter II.C covers the cost of microgrids and the cost of microgrid resilience; 
Chapter II.D covers trade-offs between different definitions and sources explored earlier. 
A. RESILIENCE 
There are many interpretations and definitions of resilience. Chapter II.A.1 collects 
and summarizes relevant definitions of resilience from the public and private sector 
perspectives while Chapter II.A.2 covers the different metrics of resilience. Once the 
various definitions and metrics have been introduced, the definition and metrics that best 
fit the purpose of the MSET capstone project will be identified.  
1. Resilience Definitions 
DOD Instruction 4170.11 defines energy resilience for DOD facilities as “the 
ability to prepare for and recover from energy disruptions that impact mission assurance 
on military installations” and critical energy requirements as “critical mission operations 
on military installations or facilities that require a continuous supply of energy in the event 
of an energy disruption or emergency” [14]. This is in line with a similar definition found 
in the Department of Defense Annual Energy Management and Resilience Report 
(AEMRR) for fiscal year 2017, which utilizes the definition of energy resilience found in 
10 U.S. Code § 101(e)(6): 
The ability to avoid, prepare for, minimize, adapt to, and recover from 
anticipated and unanticipated energy disruptions in order to ensure energy 
availability and reliability sufficient to provide for mission assurance and 
readiness, including task critical assets and other mission essential 
operations related to readiness, and to execute or rapidly reestablish mission 
essential requirements. [14] 
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Anticipated and unanticipated energy disruptions can include adversarial actions, 
extreme weather events, or natural disasters. The report further asserted that multiple 
methods can achieve energy resilience with microgrid application, including storage of 
energy which is key to a system’s ability to absorb a disruptive event without dropping all 
loads.  
Additionally, DOD “doctrine prescribes resiliency using a days of autonomy 
metric. For naval facilities, this metric is seven days of autonomy as driven by UFC 3–540-
01, which dictates the amount of onsite fuel storage for backup generators” [15]. The U.S. 
armed forces established metrics for critical mission support; to be considered resilient, a 
DOD microgrid system must support critical loads directly after a disruptive event as well 
as pre-defined amount of time after. Installations must last 14 days for the Army and 
Marines. UFC 3–540-01 dictates that seven days of autonomy are required for naval 
facilities [15]. 
The NAVFAC P-602 provides a resilience definition from the standpoint of naval 
facilities. The P-602 addresses types of disturbances that could be relevant for energy 
security at naval facilities, and further ties the concept of resiliency to mission: 
Resiliency is the ability of a system to anticipate, resist, absorb, respond, 
adapt, and recover from a disturbance. Threats that may cause a disturbance 
include weather events, accidents, geo-magnetic storms, terrorism, fire, 
cyberattack, and the effects of climate change e.g., sea level rise. Energy 
resiliency will ensure DON installations have the ability to both prepare for 
and recover from utility interruptions that impact mission assurance and 
installations. [16] 
Yodo and Wang’s “In Engineering Resilience Quantification and System Design 
Implications: A Literature Survey” discusses the development of a general analysis 
framework with a focus on engineering resilience that can be utilized for system design. 
Yodo and Wang [17] start by introducing an ecological definition of resilience, “resilience 
in an eco-system is defined as the speed with which an ecosystem returns to its equilibrium 
state following a perturbation” [18]. The concept of resilience in engineering has been 
strongly influenced by the ecological idea of how quickly the system can be returned to 
equilibrium. In engineering, after a disruptive event, equilibrium refers to the speed at 
15 
which a system can adapt and recover from that state of disruption. Based on this definition 
of resilience, Yodo and Wang introduce the engineering resilience curve, Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. General Resilience Curve with Four States. Source: [17]. 
In Figure 3, the bold line represents the system performance over time. The 
performance is constant until a disruptive event occurs, at which point the system’s 
performance drops to some degraded state. In the Figure, the system performance degrades 
at a constant rate until recovery takes place at time tv, then the system performance 
increases at a constant rate until performance returns to the pre-disruptive state. This is an 
idealized curve because of the linear degradation and recovery; a real-world example could 
have convex, concave, linear, or non-linear unreliability and recovery profiles as shown in 
Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 shows only the different recovery profiles. Figure 5 provides the 
most realistic resilience curve with a nonlinear unreliability and recovery profile with no 




Figure 4. Depiction of Various Unreliability. Source: [17]. 
 
Figure 5. Recovery Profiles Possible for Resilience Curves. Source: [17]. 
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The possible unreliability and recovery profiles depicted in Figure 5 provide a more 
realistic perspective of an engineering resilience curve following a disruptive event as it is 
unrealistic to assume engineered systems will follow a linear unreliability and/or recovery 
profile. Yodo and Wang continue to build on this profile for a more realistic resilience 
curve, which is called the Five State Resilience curve, as shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. General Resilience Curve with Five States. Source: [17]. 
The key difference between Figure 5 (four-state curve) and Figure 6 (five-state 
curve) is the addition of the steady disrupted state depicted by SIII, which equates to a 
stabilization period prior to proceeding to a recovery state. 
The microgrid resilience curve introduced by Anderson is very similar with slightly 
different terminology and is more focused for DOD applications, which is a better fit for 
MSET research. The resilience curve depicted in Figure 7 is Yodo and Wang’s five-state 
resilience curve which differs from their previous curve with the addition of a high impact 
but low probability (HILP) disturbance that results in microgrid performance degradation 
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and limited to a single scenario (e.g., one hurricane, tornado, etc.). The performance of a 
microgrid is defined by the percentage of the load demand carried by that microgrid [19].  
 
Figure 7. Microgrid Resilience Curve. Source: [19]. 
The re-creation shown in Figure 7 incorporates more descriptive and meaningful 
labels for the five different states that occur during a disruption scenario. Invulnerability 
represents the overall loss of microgrid performance caused by a disruptive event. The 
green recovery across the top of Figure 7 represents the time required for a microgrid to 
recover from a disruptive event to the pre-disruptive level of performance. Anderson’s 
invulnerability is the same as the impact area described by Yodo and Wang, who consider 
resilience from the perspective of recoverably and reliability [17]. Anderson, however, 
primarily focuses on recoverability, defining resilience as the “microgrid’s invulnerability 
and rapid and full recoverability from an improbable and severe disturbance” [19]. 
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Peterson’s resilience definition also draws from the same sources summarized at 
the beginning of the literature review, and can be defined as the “ability of the system to 
maximize functionality in the event of a disruption...by considering both likelihood and 
impact of each disruption” [12]. The literature review performed by MSET determined that 
a combination of both Anderson and Peterson’s definitions of resilience best suits MSET’s 
needs. MSET defines microgrid resilience as a microgrid’s invulnerability and a rapid and 
full recoverability from an improbable and severe disturbance while maximizing 
functionality in the event of such a disturbance. Maximizing resiliency means the system 
provides the maximum functionality possible against the entire set of potential disruptions, 
considering both the likelihood and impact of each disruption [12], [19]. 
2. Resilience Metrics 
Yodo and Wang provide excellent insight on the profile of resilience curves as well 
as metrics by which one can measure resilience. Their work introduces three different 
resilience metrics:  
1. “Resilience metrics based on resilience curve” [17]  
2. “Resilience metrics based on pre- and post-disruption” [17]  
3. “Resilience metrics based on reliability and restoration” [17] 
Yodo and Wang’s first quantification method uses properties of the resilience 
curve, primarily the impact area (IA), as seen in Figure 5. The IA is the area of the curve 
that indicates performance loss due to a disruptive event and can be derived mathematically 
using integrals.  
The second way to quantify resilience is to use a ratio that represents the change in 
a system’s performance from pre-disturbance to post-disturbance. However, expressing 
resilience in this manner shows that performance is extremely dependent on the system and 
its use. Every microgrid, installation, and power requirement are unique and therefore, 
resilience parameters based on pre- and post-disruption are only useful for doing a self-
comparison, so this metric will not be discussed or utilized. 
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The final methodology Yodo and Wang describe is based on restoration and 
reliability explains, 
A mathematical formula has been derived to quantitatively measure the 
resilience of engineered systems with two essential attributes as reliability 
and restoration, in which system reliability quantifies the ability of an 
engineered system to maintain its capacity and performance above a safety 
limit during a given period of time under stated conditions, whereas 
restoration measures the ability of an engineered system to restore its 
capacity and performance by detecting, predicting, and mitigating/
recovering from the system-wide effects of adverse events. [17] 
The third metric that Yodo and Wang discussed for resilience of reliability and 
restoration aligns best with MSET’s determination of how military microgrid resilience 
should be measured. Yodo and Wang’s work will be the foundation with which the MSET 
tool is developed, both a clear understanding of their resilience definitions will be 
necessary in the assessment of how and if the tool can be integrated with the MSET power 
flow and resilience tool.  
In addition to resilience metrics defined by Yodo and Wang, Panteli et al. [20]. 
developed the ΦΛEΠ (FLEP) to model and quantify resilience performance of a microgrid 
after a catastrophic event. As seen in Figure 6, the shape of the curve found between td and 
tn, is described by Panteli et al. as the “resilience trapezoid,” which he further segregates 
into three phases, as seen in Figure 8.  
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Figure 8. Panteli et al.’s Depiction of the Resilience Trapezoid. Source: [20]. 
Phase I or Disturbance Progress, is intended to measure how quickly resilience 
drops (Φ), as well as how low it will drop (Λ). Phase II, the post-disturbance degraded state 
also known as the stabilization state measures (E), the length or extensiveness of the 
degraded state. Finally, Phase III, the restorative state, measures (Π), which is how quickly 
the microgrid can return to its pre-disturbance state of performance [20]. 
Current microgrid literature is abundant in resilience metrics. As Anderson states, 
“there is little-to no understanding of what design components are most useful to enhancing 
resilience for off-grid microgrids” [19]. Anderson’s paper reviews the Energy Resilience 
Assessment (ERA) tool and the Energy Security Assessment Tool (ESAT) intended to 
assess resilience for a base power grid. However, these tools were determined to be of 
limited use as they fail to provide sufficient or meaningful data for the resilience 
assessment of a naval installation microgrid that has lost connection, or never had 
connection, to an outside utility provider, the very circumstance MSET seeks to address.  
There have been numerous attempts from researchers to assign proper metrics for 
resilience in electrical power distribution systems. The common ground among their work 
is that resilience is considered a time-dependent performance function. From this shared 
definition, each researcher proceeded to develop their own independent resilience metrics. 
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One approach to calculate resilience based on loss was developed by Li et al. [21]. The 
authors measure the resilience curve using resilience = (1/loss), where loss is calculated as  






          (2.1) 
Loss is determined by the ratio of largest performance loss due to a certain 
disrupting event and the current performance state over a long period of time [19]. 
Zobel calculates resilience by taking a percentage of total possible loss X at 
disruption time T over the time required to fully recover [22]: 
 𝑅(𝑋, 𝑇) = 1 −
𝑋𝑇
2𝑇∗
           (2.2) 
However, the weakness in this methodology is that it is only useful to determine 
the resilience of a microgrid at a defined moment and does not account for a measurement 
of resilience over an extended period [19]. 
The metrics introduced in Equations 2.1 and 2.2 do not account for the stochastic 
behavior of disruptive events that affect the resilience of microgrids. Anderson [19] has 
presented many cases where the researchers utilize predictive modeling for system 
performance factors that influence system performance in the measurement of resilience. 
He utilized a code-based metric for time durations that considered outage durations and 
spatial impact. MSET considers this metric overly complex with limited improvements to 
the product, so there is no current intent to include it in the product.  
The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) uses value of lost load 
(VoLL) for a resilience metric. VoLL is a resilience metric that factors in costs, this could 
include business interruption costs, recovery costs, or losses of perishables or assets [23]. 
Though considering resilience in terms of a dollar cost value is very intuitive, it has limited 
application. Anderson et al. [19]. narrowed down the VoLL to applying for loss of critical 
load, Lc, during the disrupting period T:  
𝑉𝑜𝑅 = 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑙 ∫ 𝐿𝑐(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0
                    (2.3) 
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Traditionally, reliability has been the greatest focus of resilience efforts [17]. 
Accordingly, several established metrics regarding reliability such as System Average 
Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI), System Average Interruption Frequency Index 
(SAIFI), Customer Average Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI), and Customer Average 
Interruption Frequency Index (CAIFI) for electrical power grids. However, a recent report 
by Sandia points out the shortcomings of solely using these metrics, as they “typically do 
not include outage information when low probability, high-consequence events such as 
storms, earthquakes, and cyber-attacks occur” [19]. The reports also suggest a metric based 
on the consequence of a specified hazard for resilience. 
Many of the metrics reviewed focus on monetary value or loss in performance. 
Fewer metrics address readiness or mission achievement. Because national security is a 
complex consideration for military installations, mission-oriented metrics should be a 
significant driver in assessment of microgrid design. Work by Judson, Pina, and Dydek 
defines the resilience by considering the “cost to relocate the mission or buy services to 
complete mission” [24]. Since this definition would be base- and mission- specific, it would 
be incredibly difficult to quantify and was deemed inapplicable for MSET’s purposes. 
Relocation or service purchasing costs are also impractical for a scenario where the base 
experiences an attack from an adversary. Scenarios such as this do not lend themselves to 
either moving the mission or purchasing the necessary services from an external entity as 
a viable solution, as such, this defined value of resiliency cannot be utilized by MSET.  
NAVFAC utilizes an operational risk metric called the mission dependency index 
(MDI), a method that quantifies a value based on a series of questions posed to indicate the 
consequence or impact if a facility is either destroyed or becomes non-functional [25]. 
Kujawski and Miller [26] identified major limitations in MDI-related metrics such as poor 
resolution, failing to quantify probability or likelihood, inconsistency in application, and 
failing to consider the time dependency of any corrective actions. 
The methodology by Peterson [12] uses MDI concepts and assigns a quantifiable 
value to the mission achievement tied to a specific power load. He uses an Expected Life 
cycle Mission Impact (ELMI) that quantifies system resilience by calculating the total 
impact of disruption events over the expected lifetime. Once ELMI is established for a 
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scenario, ELMIs can be evaluated to determine the main drivers that affect mission impact. 
Peterson’s model estimates facility loads and PV power generation and simulates the 
microgrid “in hourly time steps to determine the microgrid system response, load shedding, 
and the subsequent mission impact in each scenario through Monte Carlo simulation 
methods” [12]. The user can iterate the model analysis for different architectures, 
generating alternate design ELMIs for direct comparison.  
B. ELECTRICAL ARCHITECTURE 
Important EE considerations for microgrids address design details and operability 
efficiencies. EE research has developed tools to conduct power flow analysis and 
distributed energy resource design. These tools are intended to assist base energy managers 
in the design of military installation microgrids from an electrical standpoint. 
Siritoglou [6] presents a design methodology for DERs that a facility manager can 
use to verify the performance requirement of a microgrid. This methodology is 
implemented in a graphic user interface tool developed in MATLAB Simulink, which was 
intended to be user-friendly. The tool is simulated and validated by physics-based models 
and experiments with microgrids built using COTS components. These components and 
their configurations comply with both IEEE Standards 1562–2007 and 1013–2007. The 
design methodology starts with determining the load, without specifying criticality. 
Predetermined days of autonomy and battery efficiency are considered along with the load 
to determine the optimal number and configuration of batteries. Siritoglou’s model then 
calculates the most efficient microgrid PV array design based on the historical data of solar 
irradiance at the location of the base. It uses the array-to-load ratio as an input and outputs 
the number and configuration of batteries and PV arrays which can then be assembled into 
a microgrid architecture, as in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. Architecture of the COTS Microgrid. Source: [6]. 
Siritoglou validated his design methodology by comparing his model simulation’s 
outputs against the outputs of an experimental COTS microgrid design assembly. He 
conducted two scenarios, 24-hour autonomy with and without sunlight, and analyzed the 
battery’s state of charge (SOC) to compare the simulation and experiment. As seen in 
Figures 10 and 11, the curves for the simulation and experiment are closely matched, 
indicating that Siritoglou’s DER design methodology is valid and accurate. 
 
Figure 10. Battery SOC (Without Sunlight). Source: [6]. 
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Figure 11. Battery SOC (With Sunlight Using Experimental PV Current). 
Source: [6]. 
Siritoglou’s model provides for several variations in input; however, its base 
software is a detriment to its utility because MATLAB is a specialized software not readily 
accessible nor familiar to base energy manager end users. Ruth Fish [27] expanded upon 
Siritoglou’s model and toolset to create the design model in Microsoft Excel and proved 
its applicability with multiple case studies.  
By converting Siritoglou’s model to a more common format, Fish’s Excel tool has 
greater utility for the intended energy manager users as the Microsoft Office suite is 
common to most computers across the DOD. Fish’s design tool considers options for the 
PV array, battery bank, and the fuel and generator storage. This tool exists in two variants: 
the automatic variant, which calculates the number and sizing of battery and PV arrays 
using commercially available component data sheets; and the manual variant, which allows 
the user to customize the battery and PV specifications individually. 
Fish’s tool further calculates the number of generators needed for the system. She 
considered greater efficiency the key consideration for generator sizing with a PV 
integrated microgrid. The efficiency of the generator is directly related to the output power 
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produced by the generator. The tool utilizes the rated generator power and the maximum 
load power to calculate the minimum number of generators needed to operate the system. 
Fish provides pre-selected generator models with distinctive functions, capabilities, and 
limitations. The fuel storage in Fish’s toolset is dependent on the user’s required duration 
of system operation. The tool will determine the amount of fuel necessary to operate the 
system autonomously for the desired period given the determined generator fuel burn rate.  
The model created by Fish uses active power balance equations so that the sources 
and load power curves can be plotted versus time. By simulating the power flow, base 
energy managers can identify patterns and discrepancies where power is deficient or in 
excess, pinpointing weaknesses in the microgrid design. Her work was validated on a 
microgrid built with commercial off the shelf (COTS) components.  
C. COST 
Most existing microgrid optimization research tends to focus on prioritizing cost 
factors and objectives. There has been significant effort put toward developing tools and 
methodologies to assess microgrid suitability in terms of cost or minimalization of life 
cycle costs, in which the formulation often assigns a cost to the unmet load. Multiple 
programs are dedicated to designing microgrids such as the Microgrid Design Toolkit 
(MDT) from Sandia National Laboratories, Hybrid Optimization model for electric 
Renewables (HOMER), and the System Advisor Model (SAM) developed by NREL [28]–
[31]. The Distributed Energy Resources – Customer Adoption Model (DER-CAM) is an 
investment decision analysis tool. It is intended to optimize investments in a variety of 
DER under consideration based on objective function over time [32]. The Sandia Microgrid 
Design Toolkit (MDT) is similar to DER-CAM in capability. It allows the user to set 
element properties and specifications and then allow optimization based on multiple 
objective functions such as fuel used, time loads are met, cost, CO2, etc. [32]. 
Cost as an objective is the easiest and most justifiable decision driver, but the 
DOD’s energy security interest is unusual in that national security is difficult to quantify 
in terms of a dollar figure. This makes many of the commercial microgrid cost tools 
unsuited for DOD application. Guidance documents for energy security in military 
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microgrids “optimize the design through the maximization of the reliability of meeting the 
critical loads given a fixed investment or targeting a specific reliability value and 
minimizing a life cycle cost objective function with reliability as a constraint” [33]. 
Therefore, in the application of microgrids in DOD application, the “research from the 
Operations Research (OR) perspective performed on microgrids and electrical 
transmission systems sets objectives based on cost, resilience, and hardening against 
attack” [12]. 
Anderson’s research [19] attempts to address the relationship of resilience and cost 
in a way that is applicable to DOD installations, explored in the context of maintenance 
levels and life cycle cost analysis of energy (LCAE). Through his thesis, Anderson seeks 
to fill the gaps he found during his literature review. He determined that “no researchers 
have explored resilience of off-grid microgrids that therefore have disturbances that are not 
due to loss of power from the utility” and that very little research has been conducted of 
the relationship of resilience versus cost.  
Hildebrand [34] takes a different approach to analyzing the relationship between 
cost and resilience by using the total life-cycle cost (LCC) of the designed microgrid. A 
more commonly used metric is levelized cost of energy (LCOE), which is often used to 
compare renewable energy resources. LCOE measures lifetime costs divided by energy 
production , which is “a useful metric to estimate cost and compare alternatives when the 
goal is to minimize cost over a system lifetime” [34]. The reason Hildebrand does not use 
LCOE is because “it is an inadequate metric if the goal is to maximize resilience or estimate 
the cost of resilience in a specific microgrid application” [34]. The reasoning traces back 
to the fundamental difference the concerns of civilian power suppliers and military 
microgrid power suppliers. Hildebrand uses Peterson’s ELMI as the resilience metric when 
comparing cost and resilience of microgrid architectures. He uses linear programming to 
determine the ELMI of each architecture using four different failure modes and develops a 
cost model for each architecture to provide the LCC. Regression analysis is then performed 
to determine the relationship between LCC and ELMI in order to “inform the design 
decisions for a naval installation microgrid” [34]. 
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D. TRADE-OFFS 
This report assesses existing research to determine effective microgrid design 
variations to allow base energy managers to easily determine which trade-offs best suit 
their installation requirements. Determining better design options requires an exercise in 
trade-offs including but not limited to design parameters such as sizing, capacity, load, 
electrical analysis, configuration, as well as reliability, procurement cost, life cycle costs, 
maximizing location, minimizing environmental factors, potential earnings, security, 
maximizing renewable resources, and of course resilience [12].  
Table 3 is a matrix cataloging the existing microgrid design and evaluation tools 
reviewed by MSET and authors represented in the literature review. MSET divided the tool 
characteristics into five trade space categories: accessibility, economics, electrical 
architecture, “-ilities,” and attributes. Each of the five categories were further divided into 
sub-categories to further specify the tool capability intention. Some of the tools listed are 
commercial software tools that can be acquired or accessed for a licensing fee or 
subscription cost, but limited access forced MSET to infer the capabilities from 
descriptions or reviews, these are indicated by triangles in the table. 
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MSET determined that accessibility carries the highest weight when assessing the 
usability of the tool. The sub-category “standard DOD software,” indicates the tool can run 
on standard software programs available to the DOD. Another sub-category, MSET access, 
indicates that the team had access to a copy of the tool during development of the tool. The 
open-source sub-category indicates there was full access to the code or formulas upon 
which MSET could build. For initial tool assessment, MSET determined that tools that 
were good candidates must have all three accessibility features. Although several other 
tools had significantly more advanced capabilities, they were often expensive, specialized, 
and/or not open source making them unsuitable for the MSET project purposes. 
The economics category consists of cost and investment attributes. Cost is the 
monetary value for a unit of power for a period. This is often a key metric in assessing the 
cost of power loss for commercial entities. Investment considers the return on investment 
for the purchase of a particular attribute in the microgrid. Investment is meant to validate 
the technical or financial performance of the microgrid over its expected lifetime.  
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The category Electrical Architecture covers EE design considerations of microgrid 
component performance. Each subcategory indicates if the toolset addressed the electrical 
design of a particular system type as listed. The matrix utilizes sub-category definitions 
primarily based off NSETTI tool functions because full access was unavailable for analysis 
of the understanding of the commercial tools.  
The “-ilities” category covers reliability, recoverability, and maintainability. These 
are intended to identify the general nature of non-functional characteristics used to evaluate 
system performance addressed by a tool during MSET’s assessment. These are 
intentionally broadly defined due to the known variation in each tool and are categorized 
in this manner to indicate the tool’s intended coverage for potential future reference.  
Finally, the attributes category covers mission impact, emissions, safety, and 
variable time scaling. The category is used as a catch all location for characteristics deemed 
important to note that lacking an overarching category. Most of the tools that fall under 
this category are commercial products on which MSET lacked visibility.  
The exploration of the trade space between the major categories is important for 
effective analysis of stakeholder options. For the DOD, the product is national defense, 
which does not have an easily defined value [36]. The quantification of DOD energy 
resilience lacks standardization and remains open to interpretation, there is no one defined 
value of resilience [37]. The primary scope of the MSET effort is to integrate existing tools 
into a single streamlined interface for base energy managers. To this end, MSET intends 
to build off the research conducted by NSETTI participants, primarily Bill Anderson, 







This chapter details the systems engineering process MSET utilized throughout this 
report. Chapter III.A provides a detailed description of the Incremental Commitment Spiral 
Model (ICSM) process and MSET’s reasoning behind its application. Further discussion 
covers the stages of the ICSM, their various phases, and how they were tailored to meet 
the needs of this report. Chapter III.B addresses the risk management process followed by 
MSET throughout the development of the tool and the reasoning behind passing a phase 
gate.  
A. ICSM SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS  
MSET utilized the ICSM systems engineering process per Figure 12. ICSM’s 
iterative nature provided greater flexibility throughout the development of the tool. It 
allowed MSET to ensure that each iteration of the process produced a functional prototype 
that satisfied the operational concept and the stakeholder before progressing to the next 
cycle. This was accomplished utilizing risk opportunity management with actual products. 
The spiral diagram of the ICSM process as applied by MSET is shown in Figure 12.  
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Figure 12. Incremental Commitment Spiral Model Tailored for the MSET 
process. Source: [36]. 
The ICSM process is broken down into activities in Figure 13 to cover the process 
life cycle from the exploration of concept through the operations and production phases 
with each phase culminating in a phase gate risk assessment. The phase gate passing criteria 
required the identification and evaluation of risk as acceptable prior to progressing to the 
next phase. If the risks were deemed high but addressable, then the project should remain 
in that phase. Too high, a non-addressable risk would indicate that the project needs to 
adjust priorities, scope, or to begin a new prototype iteration to restart the ICSM process 
cycle. Only an acceptable or negligible risk assessment will allow progression through the 
phase gate on to the next phase. 
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Figure 13. Incremental Commitment Life Cycle Progress Overview. 
Source: [38]. 
MSET utilized a tailored ICSM approach by combining the exploration and 
valuation phases; Boehm refers to this pattern as “Target Solutions Available.” Chapter 
II.D covers the exploration and valuation phases in which MSET established scope 
boundaries by assessing microgrid toolsets currently available and using it to determine 
which tools were viable for MSET purposes. MSET performed a literature review at the 
outset which revealed several tools were already available. Since the purpose of this report 
was to take separate tools with different capabilities and integrate them into a single tool, 
as such, a combination of the exploration and valuation phase was determined to be the 
best approach, as shown in Figure 14. This allowed for concurrent identification of 
capability needs, constraints, opportunities, and alternative solution analyses and 
identification of desired options. When MSET began this technical effort, there were 
already several NSETTI tools in various stages of development with differing levels of 
maturity. As toolsets from William Anderson, Josh Hildebrand, and Dan Beaton, who were 
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conducting their own work concurrently with MSET came available, MSET was able to 
integrate more functionality from their research into the MSET tool. 
 
Figure 14. Breakdown of Different Process Options Based on Project Start 
Point. Source: [38]. 
Once past the Exploration/Valuation phase gate, the next step was the foundations 
phase. Along with ensuring technology readiness for needed capabilities, this phase activity 
also prioritizes features and requirements for development; monitors changes in needs, 
opportunities and risks; and updates risks and risk mitigation plans [38]. The foundations 
phase gate was assessed as low risk since this technical report was scoped to accept existing 
microgrid tools at their current maturity level.  
The development phase produces an incremental development prototype and 
incremental foundations re-baseline. MSET continuously reassessed the capability and 
constraints of the individual toolsets when delving deeper into each. MSET scrutinized 
each feature to determine if it was worth keeping or if other tools should be reassessed for 
usability in contrast to initial planning. The MSET ICSM process activities end at 
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development, specifically because the production and operation phase are for user release 
and use. Since this technical report focused on producing multiple iterations of the tool to 
bring it to the furthest integration development within the limited time frame, there was no 
attempt to proceed into the production or operation phase.  
B. RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS  
The five-step risk management process outlined in the Department of Defense Risk, 
Issue, and Opportunity Management Guide for Defense Acquisition Programs [39] was 
used to manage programmatic risk, and is subsequently outlined in the following 
paragraphs. The same risk-opportunity fundamentals were also leveraged for the ICSM 
process. The first phase of the five-step process is the risk process planning which is 
intended to develop methods or processes to manage individual risks. Once the risk process 
planning phase was complete, MSET identified various risks that could affect the project, 
and determined the effects each risk could have on the overall success of the program 
during the analysis process. The estimation of likelihood that the risk will occur was 
assessed and once the possible foreseen risks were identified and analyzed, MSET 
developed a plan to mitigate the identified risks. In this step, MSET attempted to lower the 
probability of the risk occurrence while trying to lower the overall consequences of the 
risk. MSET applied this risk management process throughout the development of the tool 
and monitored all listed programmatic risks to determine if mitigation plans were working 
and/or if risks changed. If the changed risks were identified a significantly different, the 
risk was reassessed through the same methodology process [39].  
The same five-step risk management process was leveraged for ICSM during the 
development of the tool. Since ICSM is a risk-based process, it was necessary to utilize the 
five-step risk process while determining when it was appropriate to move to the next phase. 
Risk-based decisions use evidence to assess feasibility risk and opportunity. The ICSM 
framework is based around the acknowledgement and management of uncertainty through 
risk and opportunities based on evidence-based decisions, phase gate milestones, and an 
incremental approach. MSET used the 5-step risk management process iteratively at each 
phase gate with a known deviation at the mitigation step. MSET assessed the risks and 
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since the scope of the project was to primarily integrate existing tools without modification, 
the mitigation step was utilized to determine only if MSET could successfully integrate 
that parameter. For ICSM tool development risk, the mitigation focused more on whether 
a successful iteration was probable as opposed to lowering the risk of integration by 
suggesting a modification or a course change on the part of the previously developed 
toolsets.  
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IV. TOOL DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter describes the development of the MSET tool. The tool was produced 
using existing EE and SE toolsets. The design of the tool follows the ICSM process, as 
outlined in Chapter III, resulting in a series of working prototypes. Each prototype is a 
spiral extension of the next, building on prior work based on evidence-based risk and 
opportunities discovered during the development cycle of each iteration. Throughout the 
development of the MSET tool, MSET’s focus was to ensure the continued development 
of an operationally functional prototype that is easily understandable and usable by base 
energy managers to assess the mission impact of microgrid variable changes. During the 
development of the tool, MSET went through five iterations (Spirals) of the tool, see Figure 
15 for summary.  
 
Figure 15. Spiral Summary  
A. FIRST SPIRAL 
This section describes the first integration effort for the MSET tool. The 
Foundations Phase of the first iteration intended to ensure that MSET considered the 
system life cycle concept and CONOPS. To this end, MSET generated an input/output 
diagram, shown in Figure 16, to illustrate and assist with comprehension of the existing 
microgrid simulation tools.  
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Figure 16. MSET Tool Input  / Output Diagram 
In order to determine the acceptable risk of proceeding into the Development Phase, 
MSET needed to fully understand the inputs and outputs used by the known available 
models. The interface document was used to prioritize the down select for tools that were 
considered the most relevant to the user needs and most suitable for integration with each 
other.  
MSET chose to utilize Giovanna Oriti’s [40] power flow model as the baseline 
microgrid tool for MSET integration. The power flow model requires a set of background 
information for proper functionality. The first task MSET took on was to divide all the data 
and user inputs into separate tabs. MSET effectively created the “User Interface” tab and a 
“Data” tab. The Data tab contains user definable stock data necessary for model reference 
in Spiral 1, which includes a table of known solar irradiance characteristics per month as 
well as the microgrid load demand requirements, depicted in Figure 21. To account for PV 
output, public data provided tailored solar characteristics for a specific location. 
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Table 5. Data Tab Regional Solar Characteristics 
 
 
Table 5 outlines both the PV output (energy) and PV width (percentage of time 
throughout one day PVs will produce). The “Data” tab also includes load demand data, which 
must be provided in four-minute time steps over a 14-day period for each month of the year. 
The load data used during development is notional data based off a sample building to avoid 
restricted distribution. This data can be seen in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Data Tab Load Demand 
 
Each cell is an open-source load demand at four-minute time steps in each month 
and spans 14-days. This data is used to determine whether the microgrid can meet the load 
demand for any particular month. The monthly load demand and PV ratings make up most 
of the data tab and necessary information to analyze the resilience of a microgrid.  
The user inputs the solar characteristics and base load requirements for their 
microgrid consideration in the “Data” tab, while the inputs that the users more frequently 
interact with were consolidated to the “User Interface” tab. In this specific case, the user 
can select the month of interest. The portions of the Power Flow model that performs the 
power balance calculations and generates power flow graphs was implemented on the 
“Power Flow” tab, which extracts the necessary inputs from the “User Interface” tab. Once 
the month is selected by the user, that month’s load data is extracted from the “Data” tab 
and populates the load column in the “Power Flow” tab and sets the amount of expected 
solar irradiance available to the PV. The solar irradiance by month is important because it 
considers the changes in the amount of sunlight throughout the year, which will affect the 
PV’s performances. 
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In addition to the “User Interface” and the “Data” tabs, the “Power Flow” tab shows 
the power flow model and a clear graphic of how three different DERs (DG, PV, and 
Battery Energy Storage System (BESS)) interact and how they support the demanded load. 
The energy management method uses the BESS, the purple line in Figure 17, to pick up 
the load when the outside utility grid connection fails at night. Figure 17 shows the battery 
state of charge (SOC) for the duration of the power flow model.  
 
Figure 17. Power Flow Model Battery State of Charge  
The state of battery charge for this particular run never drops below 50%, meaning 
the PV or DG were always able to take over by the time 50% of the battery charge had 
been depleted. Again, the duration is 14 days, which is in line with the load data being 
pulled from the data tab. Where Figure 17 shows information on the battery, other graphs 
portray the relationship of activities between two or all three of the energy producing 
sources show in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18. Power Flow Output Showing Interaction Between DG, PV, and 
Load 
After the first 30 minutes of the simulation, the DG (blue line in Figure 18) starts 
up because the BESS has reached a 50% SOC. At this point, the DG carries the load as 
well as charges the BESS. The DG and PV activity can be seen in Figure 18. When the sun 
comes up, the PV, shown by the green line in Figure 18, starts producing power, and in 
conjunction with the BESS, supplies the load demand during the day, allowing the DG to 
shut down. Once the sun goes down and the PV no longer supplies power, the DG and the 
BESS cycle through the night in order to reduce fuel requirements. Figure 19 shows all 




Figure 19. Original Power Flow Model Inputs 
The user is not required to change the “sun is less,” “sun returns,” and “sunlight” 
values as these are specific to simulating a cloudy day. If the user desires a sunny day 
condition, the user may leave these “sun” values blank. The original power flow model 
was not modified in any way and a more detailed explanation of the functionality of the 
model can be found in [40]. 
MSET noted that the inputs could be organized to be more user-friendly by 
condensing user input information together and categorizing them by DER type, grouping 
reference information separately, and showing output data in an area of its own. The “User 
Interface” tab allowed for groupings of the more common input changes for this and future 
input features. As additional models were integrated into the MSET tool, the input sheet 
was expected to expand and be reorganized to maximize the interface for intuition. 
The power flow model output remained on the “User Interface” tab to clearly 
indicate how each DER contributes to meeting the load demand. During this Development 
Phase, MSET discovered a coding issue with the DG power output in column G of the 
“Power Flow” tab. Testing revealed that some of the power flow-generated DG outputs in 
the output graphs were greater than the user input DG ratings, which should not be possible. 
The microgrid model should not be able to produce more than the input specification of its 
DERs. This flaw was due to the DG being coded to always supply the necessary power to 
carry the critical load, even if it required power beyond the capacity of the DG. After 
numerous unsuccessful attempts to fix the coding, MSET worked around this limitation of 
the model by plotting the input DG rating directly on the power flow graph shown in Figure 
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20. The black line on the graph allows the user to visually identify when the DG provides 
more power than for what it is rated.  
 
Figure 20. Power Flow Graph Presented in the “User Inputs” Tab of the 
MSET Tool 
Figure 20 shows four instances where the blue DG output line crosses the black DG 
rating line, indicating that the DG output is not possible. To avoid instances where visual 
identification was not clear, a tabular dimension with a text “Yes / No,” shown in Figure 
21, was provided to indicate the possibility of the DG output.  
 
Figure 21. DG Output Possible from the “User Interface” Tab 
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If this field is “NO,” the user is immediately able to identify the error and change 
the DG power ratings entered before moving on to further analysis. Having a simple yes/
no answer, relieves the user from having to interpret the graph. With these modifications 
made, MSET moved onto testing the integrated model. 
Toward the end of this spiral, testing was conducted to ensure that no issues were 
created during the integration of the user interface tab and the power flow model. Test cases 
were created to ensure the MSET tool continued to output the same results as those of the 
original tool. The three test cases for spiral 1 are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. Spiral 1 Test Cases 
Purpose Month PV Rating 
(MW) 
Expected Results  Notes 
Does changing the user input 
change the power flow 
parameters? 






Expected Results  Notes 
Does the DG graph drop as the 
DG rating decreases? 
0.15 N/A DG Graph should show a 
decrease 
Incorrect Output 
Does the model detect if the DG 
output is impossible? 




The first test case was conducted to ensure that the power flow graphics changed 
in accordance with the user inputs on the “User Interface” tab, which meant the input 
parameters on the “User Interface” tab were linked properly to the required inputs in the 
“Power Flow” tab. The second test case was driven by observations made while putting 
different DG ratings in the inputs. The observation was that the blue DG line in the power 
flow graph did not hit an upper limit if an undersized DG was used. MSET’s workaround 
for this problem is described in the previous paragraph and the failed test was considered 
acceptable with the mitigation in place. The final test case tests the coding of the “DG 
output possible?” output. As shown in Table 7, a DG rating of 0.2 MW was input and the 
maximum value of the DG output in the “Power Flow” tab was 0.247. The DG output is 
not physically possible so an answer of “NO” was output representing correct tool 
48 
behavior. With the test cases showing that the integration was successful, MSET turned to 
adding greater capability to the model in the form of a resilience calculation function. 
B. SECOND SPIRAL 
MSET’s second iteration intended to bring simplified components of Anderson’s 
model and link it with the MSET tool. Adding the new components immediately expanded 
the “User Interface” output table with a numerical score display, between 0 and 1, of the 
microgrid configuration’s resilience, invulnerability, and recovery. Most of the second 
spiral was dedicated to adding the additional inputs required to make the resilience model 
operate. The first point of interaction between the current MSET tool and Anderson’s 
resilience model was the load profile, which is linked directly from the “Power Flow” tab. 
The load data was pulled selectively per hour because the “Power Flow” tab required 4-
minute timesteps while Anderson’s model required 1-hour time steps. The second point of 
interaction is the power rating of each DER asset, which are transferred directly from the 
“User Interface” tab. Risks encountered during this spiral forced MSET to adjust priorities 
and scope to achieve a successful working model that incorporated the resilience analysis 
function. The first trial was discontinued after determination of unacceptable risk to the 
project schedule, but the second redirected trial led to a successful integration.  
1. Second Spiral – Trial 1 
In the first trial, MSET wanted to incorporate resilience analysis. MSET learned 
through the first spiral that merging complex models in their entirety caused difficulty with 
tool integration. It is worth noting that Anderson’s model has higher granularity than the 
power flow simulation and incorporates wind turbines as part of the microgrid 
configuration. Therefore, for the second spiral, MSET attempted to simplify Anderson’s 
resilience model to the directly relevant functions and components, focusing only on the 
outputs: invulnerability, recovery, and their relevance to resilience.  
MSET gathered preliminary microgrid data in preparation for the case study using 
real world data from a naval installation that consisted of DGs, PVs, batteries, and 
explicitly did not include wind turbines. Since the power flow model did not take wind 
turbines into consideration, and knowing the future case study lacked wind turbines, MSET 
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predicted that the model could be further simplified by removing the wind turbine feature 
from the resilience model. However, the high level of coupling throughout the model made 
removing a single component extremely difficult, incurring significant risk. After the wind 
turbines were removed, testing resulted in numerous malfunctions due to the removed 
components and its coded interactions with formulas throughout Anderson’s model. 
Several attempts to reorganize and remove wind turbines all continued to result in similar 
errors. The process of combing through the entire model to remove the wind turbine 
component completely was taking excessive amounts of time. MSET evaluated the risk of 
continuing as too high and, as a result, MSET reentered the second spiral with Anderson’s 
original resilience model without any modification.  
2. Second Spiral – Trial 2 
After MSET determined the scale of risk associated with removing the wind 
turbines, MSET elected to leave the wind turbines in place and manually ignore them by 
setting the power ratings to “0” and the control authority variable, a built-in feature of 
Anderson’s model, to “0” (Not used). Setting the wind turbines to zero simulated their 
absence without disrupting the other aspects of the model. 
The MSET tool in this trial was based on a single architecture consisting of a single 
DER unit of each type, whereas Anderson’s resilience model permitted various architecture 
options allowing multiple units of DERs. Although having multiple DERs is a more 
accurate approach, only one of each DER component was considered in this spiral. Setting 
the remaining DER to zero allowed the components to act as placeholders to leave room 
for potential future expansion of the tool. The final step in the second spiral was to link the 
primary outputs of invulnerability, recoverability, and resilience to the output section of 
the “User Interface” tab which would provide a resilience assessment of the DER 
architecture and chosen component ratings to the user. 
Table 8 catalogs the tests performed at the end of the second spiral. These tests 
were performed to ensure the integration of the resilience tool once again into the MSET 
tool did not cause any unexpected behavior.  
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Expected Results Notes 
Does changing the user input change 
the power flow parameters? 
Medium Hurricane Changing maintenance 
level and disruptive 








Expected Results Notes 
When removing the wind turbine, 
does the resilience score increase 
when the DG rating & maintenance 
level increase? 




When setting the wind turbine rating 
= 0, does resilience score increase 
then the DG rating & maintenance 
level increase? 




Does the resilience output update 
correctly on the “User Interface” 
Tab? 
0.3 → 0.6 None → Medium “User Interface” Tab 





The first test case was specific to the power flow in Anderson’s tool. Changing the 
maintenance level and disruptive event in the “User Interface” tab changes those 
parameters in the “Resilience Model” tab, representing a correct interface between the two 
MSET tool tabs. The second test case shows why MSET decided to set the wind turbine 
power ratings to zero instead of trying to remove them. When MSET tried removing the 
wind turbines from the model, the model output was not as expected. The third test case 
was the same as the second test case but had the desired output. When the DG rating was 
increased from 0.3 MW to 0.6 MW and the maintenance level was increased from none to 
medium, the resilience score increased. Finally, the fourth test case verified that the change 
in the resilience score in the “Resilience Model” tab was linked properly to the “User 
Interface” tab. 
C. THIRD SPIRAL 
After the successful integration of the second spiral, MSET focused on adding more 
capability by trying to slightly modify the resilience model instead of incorporating another 
model. The first trial effort involved utilizing Microsoft Excel’s built-in solver function to 
determine an ideal set of DER power ratings based on achieving a higher resilience score. 
The second trial was intended to validate the resilience model by observing an ideal 
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resilience score of 1.00. These first two trials both failed that ultimately lead to the final 
trial which attempted the integration of Anderson’s cost model into the overall MSET tool.  
1. Third Spiral – Trial 1 
Due to the complexity of Anderson’s tool, MSET considered the tool as two 
separate functions, the resilience model and the cost model, each of which were transferred 
to the MSET tool in a tab of their own. Initial integration attempted to determine optimal 
DER power ratings by using the Microsoft Excel’s built-in solver. Based on the user inputs 
from earlier development spirals, a resilience score was calculated using Anderson’s 
methodology which was incorporated in the “Resilience Model” tab. Equation 4.1 was used 
to calculate an aggregate resilience score by weighing invulnerability and recovery with an 
alpha coefficient.  
 ξ =α invulnerability + (1−α) recovery (4.1) 
The alpha coefficient can vary depending on the geographic area of the microgrid, 
but the original resilience model was built with an alpha coefficient of 0.5, meaning the 
resilience score was affected equally by the invulnerability and the recovery of the 
microgrid. The invulnerability term in Equation 4.1 is defined as the ratio of the stabilized 
microgrid capacity after a disruptive event, divided by the microgrid power capacity prior 
to the disturbance. Invulnerability is shown mathematically in Equation 4.2.  
  𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝑃𝑡𝑠
𝑃𝑡𝑑
  (4.2) 
In Equation 4.2, Pts the stabilized power capacity and Ptd is the pre-disturbance 
power capacity [19]. The recovery term is the ratio of the area bounded between the 
demand and post-disturbance generation curve divided by the demand curve, shown 
mathematically in Equation 4.3, where Dt is the demand at time t, and Gt is the post-
disturbance power generation at time t [19].  







  (4.3) 
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The addition of the solver was meant to determine the ideal combination of the 
power ratings of DG, PV, and battery for the maximum resilience score. Initial constraints 
were set such that the new resilience score would be greater than the current score and less 
than 1, with invulnerability and recovery scores of less than 1. Different test cases were 
executed to validate the newly implemented capability. The expected result was that the 
PV, DG, and battery power ratings would change, but instead, the solver results revealed 
enormous values for PV and minimum (even negative) values for the DG and battery 
ratings. To adjust for this issue, a constraint was added to ensure the resultant DER power 
ratings were values greater than zero with the hopes that the load would be spread between 
the different DERs. Increasing the number of constraints resulted in the solver being unable 
to meet the constraints or again, only change a single variable instead of balancing the three 
DER options. The constraint on the resilience score was opened up to limit the possible 
results to be greater than 0.6 but less than 1.0, and the constraints on the DERs were 
adjusted to require minimum values for each DER in order to ensure each was used. Yet 
again, the solver either generated errors or was unable to meet the constraints during most 
attempts. The times the solver was able to generate an acceptable combination of DER 
ratings with a high resilience score, the configuration was unable to supply the required 
load during the periods of darkness. After considerable effort, MSET determined that 
utilizing solver in this way was too risky. The effort was halted because of the extended 
time spent investigating this and that MSET was increasingly drawn into adjusting the 
invulnerability calculation in Anderson’s model, both of which were clear deviations from 
the original scope of the project. 
2. Third Spiral – Trial 2  
Frustrations with the previous solver trial drew MSET to test the MSET tool 
without a disruption event to observe an ideal case that would result in a resilience score 
of 1.0. MSET executed a scenario without a disruptive event, but the model behaved in an 
unexpected manner. The invulnerability appeared to be driven by the minimum load 
demand as the logic for determining Pts would find the minimum microgrid capacity. 
Without a disruption event, the resilience model resulted in DER power ratings that 
consistently met the minimum demand over the two-week period; however, there was no 
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stabilized power to use in the invulnerability calculation presented in Equation 4.2. 
Likewise, without post-disturbance power generation for Equation 4.3, there was no way 
to calculate recoverability.  
Reliability and resilience definitions are based on exclusively post-disturbance 
behavior and therefore was impossible to set up or verify the model prior to a disturbance 
to observe an ideal resilience score of 1.0. MSET initially considered this an error and spent 
considerable time investigating the integration of the model and then searching for an error 
in the original model. After several consultations with the model’s author, MSET realized 
we had become fixated on an impossibility, and a resilience score was reliant on a 
disturbance event. “After a HILP disturbance we would never expect this situation wherein 
the demand drops below the degraded power capacity immediately following the 
disturbance” [41]. MSET concluded that our interpretation of the invulnerability equation 
caused the misunderstanding and a resilience score of a normal operating microgrid cannot 
be measured since an undisturbed microgrid’s invulnerability and recovery cannot be 
measured.  
3. Third Spiral – Trial 3  
After the earlier false starts and reviewing the project scope, MSET turned to the 
cost portion of Anderson’s model, which was incorporated into the MSET tool as the “Cost 
Model (NPV)” tab. Anderson’s cost model considers cost metrics in terms of life cycle cost 
of energy demand (LCOED), life cycle cost analysis of energy (LCAE), and life cycle cost 
analysis (LCA). Further information about these metrics can be found in Anderson’s thesis 
[19]. These cost metrics were calculated through investment cost, maintenance level, and 
vendor’s operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. Investment cost and the O&M costs are 
fixed for each DER asset, where the maintenance costs vary based on the selected 
maintenance level. Maintenance costs increase as the level of maintenance increases per 
methodology defined in Anderson’s thesis [19]. 
Investment and O&M costs combined with the discount rate, also known as the 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC), were used to calculate the net present value 
(NPV) at the end of a 10-year period. Anderson had determined that doubling the 
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recommended amount of maintenance was not a good return on investment, so three 
maintenance levels: none, low, and medium were chosen to illustrate the range of O&M 
cost options. Medium maintenance is set as the vendor’s recommended annual 
maintenance, represented as Jyi in Figure 22. A low maintenance level is set at a 22% 
reduction of the vendor’s recommended O&M costs, and a maintenance level of “none” 
indicates that no maintenance is performed, nor costs generated. Figure 22 shows how DER 
O&M costs (Myi) for specific maintenance levels are calculated annually [19]. 
 
Figure 22. Maintenance Cost Calculation Using Vendor’s Recommended 
O&M Cost. Source: [19]. 
The maintenance costs of each DER are assumed to be constant through the ten-
year period. Maintenance costs here are simple because of the single architecture nature of 
the MSET tool. Cost model calculations were separated into the MSET “Cost Model 
(NPV)” tab, and additional inputs were added to the “User Interface” tab to allow the users 
to select the maintenance level and the discount rate. The validation and verification of 
Anderson’s cost model was straightforward. Tests were performed to ensure MSET and 
the cost model output values were identical, given the same input values to ensure the 
integration did not interfere with the cost model functionality. Table 9 shows examples of 
test cases that were performed during the third spiral. 
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Table 9. Spiral 3 Test Cases 
Purpose Maintenance 
Level 
DER Rating Expected Results Notes 
Does the LCOE cost 
metric change as the 
maintenance and DER 
rating increase? 
None → Medium Increase 
 
LCOE cost metric 
increase and reflected in 
the “User Interface” Tab 
Correct 
Output 
Does the resilience score 
increase as the 
maintenance level 
increase? 
None → Medium No Change Resilience score increase Correct 
Output 




Expected Results Notes 
 
Does the resilience go up 






Resilience score increase Correct 
Output 
 
At the end of Spiral 3, Anderson’s [19] resilience model and cost model had been 
integrated into the MSET tool. Test cases were able to observe expected relationships—as 
DER ratings increased; costs (LCOED) also increased because larger components had to 
be purchased. The test case with unchanged DER power ratings, but increased maintenance 
levels, was also run through a Monte Carlo simulation at 2,000 iterations, and the resilience 
score was observed to increase as expected. Finally, as the DG rating was increased, the 
resilience increased, which is the proper behavior. At this time, no other DERs were 
adjusted to see if cost or resilience increased because the number of iterations required to 
smooth out the random distribution within the resilience model was prohibitive to in depth 
testing, which the team would later realize was a mistake. Now MSET was complete with 
the third spiral, and we turned our sights to adding more capability to the MSET tool.  
D. FOURTH SPIRAL  
During the development of the MSET tool, two other microgrid evaluation models 
were in parallel development: Hildebrand’s [34] NPV cost model and Beaton’s [42] ESS 
resilience model Hildebrand’s NPV cost model focused on the lifetime cost and resilience 
of a microgrid system while Beaton’s ESS resilience model focused on resilience 
improvement through changing BESS architecture and power ratings. Initially, the MSET 
tool accepted data inputs for a single critical load, where the ESS resilience model required 
a detailed breakdown of individual loads that the microgrid would support. The MSET tool 
established its assessment early on for a single architecture in which the integration of the 
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ESS resilience model would be a greater risk because of its significant input deviations 
from the existing MSET tool.  
Hildebrand’s NPV cost model was the best fit for the next development iteration 
due to the more comparable assessment methodologies, but modifications were necessary 
to ensure proper conversion between the NPV cost tool and the MSET tool. The previous 
iterations referenced PV in terms of the power rating provided by the user on the “User 
Interface” tab. The NPV cost model used the user-input power rating and generated the 
cost of a PV system based on the area of the solar panels. The way PV was input and 
calculated throughout the MSET tool became consistent and condensed by converting the 
power rating of the PV to the solar panel area (m2) using Equation 4.4 and 4.5 in the NPV 
cost model tab [43].  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 × 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 (4.4) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑢𝑝𝑢𝑡×𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦)
 (4.5) 
The NPV cost model quantifies the cost of resilience in the net present value of the 
microgrid over ten years. MSET’s incremental approach incorporated the NPV calculation 
to explore the cost quantitative portion for our user inputs separate from the resilience. The 
NPV model required the use of MATLAB to determine the ELMI value. MSET decided to 
remove the ELMI database from Hildebrand’s tool that utilized MATLAB and replaced it 
with an “ELMI” tab that utilized Peterson’s methodology with the resilience model to 
generate the ELMI of the user-defined microgrid. 
Hildebrand assembled cost tables for each of the DERs based on investment and 
O&M costs across a range of power ratings. These tables were derived from numerous 
sources including generator sales representatives, FY21 Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 
fuel cost standards, and representative models of ESS and PV systems. The data used to 
construct cost builds for each of the DERs are expected to change over time. These cost 
tables were reorganized and collected in the “Data” tab of the MSET tool. The NPV cost 
calculation was implemented in the “Cost Model (NPV)” tab of the MSET tool. This 
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calculation integrated the inputs from the “User Interface” tab and the “Resilience Model” 
tab using the Excel NPV function [44]. 
In addition to the cost calculations, the battery efficiencies were observed utilizing 
Oriti’s and Anderson’s model. Oriti’s and Anderson’s models allowed for any battery 
efficiency to be used; however, Hildebrand’s cost model had the limitation of estimating 
costs of an efficiency of 0.80 and 0.95. MSET modified the tool to limit battery efficiency 
options to that available in the cost data provided based on the ESS cost table. The input 
for the battery efficiency was a dropdown menu with two options of 0.80 and 0.95 battery 
efficiency, and the DER ratings were rounded up to the next closes rating/cost for NPV 
purposes only. Once the fix was implemented, MSET performed numerous tests to ensure 
the investment cost changes were responding correctly to changes in battery efficiency and 
power rating, per Table 10. Expected values were defined prior to testing, and all results 
matched expectations. 
Table 10. Spiral 4 Test Cases for Battery Cost 







Does investment cost change with 
changes in battery capacity? 
0.9 0.8 -$214,678 Correct Output 
Does investment cost change with 
changes in battery capacity? 
1 0.8 -$214,678 Correct Output 
Does investment cost change with 
changes in battery capacity? 
1.1 0.8 -$429,356 Correct Output 
Does investment cost change with 
changes in battery capacity? 
2.1 0.8 -$644,034 Correct Output 
Does investment cost change with 
changes in battery efficiency? 
0.9 0.95 -$1,034,280 Correct Output 
Does investment cost change with 
changes in battery efficiency? 
1 0.95 -$1,034,280 Correct Output 
Does investment cost change with 
changes in battery efficiency? 
1.1 0.95 -$2,068,560 Correct Output 
Does investment cost change with 
changes in battery efficiency? 
2.1 0.95 -$3,102,840 Correct Output 
 
The original NPV model was designed to generate the NPVs for multiple DER 
rating combinations to find the most efficient and affordable solution to increase microgrid 
resilience. The MSET tool considers the resilience of a single set of DER ratings at a time. 
MSET assessed that the NPV calculation methodology was the most compatible with 
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Hildebrand’s work. The NPV calculation assumed the vendor recommended O&M costs 
for each of the DERs, which meant that all costs were defined at the medium level of 
maintenance used in the “Cost Model (NPV)” tab. During the integration of the NPV 
calculation, MSET ensured to account for different levels of maintenance cost by 
incorporating Anderson’s maintenance level methodology, as seen in Figure 21 to ensure 
that the user selection of maintenance level in the “User Interface” tab was reflected in the 
NPV. 
The NPV cost model evaluates resilience using ELMI in correlation with NPV 
costs. The team created an “ELMI” tab to correlate overall resilience with the “Resilience 
Model” tab, which allowed the comparison of the similarities between ELMI and NPV 
versus the resilience score and NPV. If the resilience metrics proved comparable, MSET 
considered ELMI the more subjective metric, so the resilience score was expected to 
become the dominant resilience metric.  
The NPV cost model incorporates resilience through the ELMI, as the “total impact 
of disruption events over the expected lifetime of the system” [12]. The ELMI is a 
numerical measure of the system resilience when experiencing a power disruption event 
through expected environmental and non-environmental threats and influence [12]. The 
ELMI value is not independently useful, but its value lies in comparison, allowing the 
evaluation of resilience in relation to different DER ratings. A lower ELMI value 
comparatively implies better resilience. ELMI is calculated using mission impact (MI) and 
mission impact over the scenario (Ms). The MI is defined as “a measure of the base 
commander’s preference for completion of a particular mission” [12]. According to 
Peterson, the MI is a subjective value between the range of 0–200, where 0 is the minimal 
priority for the base commander while 200 is the highest priority. For the MSET tool, a 
middling MI value of 100 was chosen to run the numerous iterations of the tool. Similarly, 
Ms is just the mean MI over all Monte Carlo simulations for that specific event scenario. 
Peterson’s resilience used Ms which was calculated for hurricanes, wildfires, 
earthquakes and cyber-attack scenarios by averaging the number of failures throughout the 
simulation using the equation below [12]. 
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𝑀𝑠 = ∑ 𝑀𝐼
𝑇
𝑡=1    (4.6) 
Once Ms was established for each event scenario, the ELMI, as discussed in 
Peterson’s thesis [12], was determined by summing the Ms values for each of the four 
events: 
 𝐸𝐿𝑀𝐼 ≡ ∑ 𝑃𝑟(𝑆 = 𝑠) 𝑀𝑠
 
𝑠∈𝑆           (4.7) 
Due to the stochastic nature of the resilience model, a certain number of iterations 
are necessary to get to the most accurate answer. The number of iterations is directly 
proportional to the tool runtime, and the team conducted a design of experiment (DOE) to 
recommend an iteration number that can balance accuracy and speed. Monte Carlo 
simulations were run with 18 different number of iterations between 500 and 7,000. Each 
run resulted in a unique ELMI value for each impacted scenario due to the stochastic 
behavior of the resilience model. Figure 23 illustrates the Ms values and ELMI scores 
resulting from the varying iteration runs. The Ms and ELMI values stabilized after 2,000 
runs, with no major deviations between 3,000-7,000 iterations. 
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Figure 23. ELMI Summary versus Number of Iterations 
Figure 23 allows the user to compare the results of different iterations runs. The 
team ran a statistical analysis to establish the recommended number of runs at a 95% 
confidence interval (CI), Table 11. 
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Table 11. Mission Impact Iteration Runs at 95% CI 
 
 
Table 11 displays the 95% confidence intervals for iterations between 500–6,000 
for the four disruptive events. MSET has 95% confidence that the MI for a wildfire event 
at 500 iterations will fall within 21.37% of the mean MI. At 2,000 iterations, the team is 
95% confident that the MI range will fall within 6.16% of the mean MI. The MSET tool 
allows the user the flexibility to select several iterations. More iterations meant a greater 
accuracy as seen in Table 11; however, it came at a cost of extended run times. For 
example, the MSET tool took approximately 20 minutes to complete 50 iterations while it 
took about 4 hours to execute 5,000 iterations.  
Figure 24 shows the comparison between percentage of error, the runtime in hour/
minute/seconds, and the number of iterations. Overall, as the number of iterations 
increased, the accuracy (percentage of error) increased, at the cost of longer runtime.  
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Figure 24. Comparison of Percent Error versus Runtime versus Number of 
Iterations for Each Disruptive Event 
In Figure 24, MSET assessed that 3,000 iterations were the most ideal iteration 
number, with MSET being 95% confident that the Ms had stabilized within 10 to 15 percent 
of the true mean during a runtime of 1 hour. A single iteration option can be chosen for 
simple NPV calculations. If the user is looking for NPV cost comparisons, a single run is 
sufficient. The NPV is not calculated in the stochastic model, so the NPV is independent 
from the number of iterations. 
Test cases were generated to verify the accurate integration of the NPV cost model, 
in “Cost Model (NPV)” and “ELMI” tabs. Table 12 covers the test cases used to identify 






Table 12. Spiral 4 Test Cases for ELMI and NPV 









Does the ELMI decrease 
when PV rating increase? 




Does the ELMI decrease 
when BESS rating increase? 




Does the ELMI decrease 
when DG rating increase? 




Does the cost increase when 
the PV Rating increases? 




Does the cost increase when 
the BESS Rating increases? 




Does the cost increase when 
the DG Rating increases? 





The resilience of a microgrid system is expected to improve (ELMI decrease) as 
the system DER components increase in size. The test cases were designed to examine 
ELMI behavior in relation to rating changes to DG, PV, and BESS. Only one DER was 
examined for changes to resilience behavior per test case to ensure a clear relationship 
correlation. The relationship between DER rating and cost was also tested to ensure 
expected correlation. Costs increased as the DER power rating increased. Each of these test 
cases matched the expected outcome trends and provided MSET the confidence to proceed 
to the fifth spiral.  
E. FIFTH SPIRAL  
MSET presented the fourth spiral of the tool to numerous stakeholders from 
NSETTI, including energy manager personnel from NAS Sigonella and NS Rota. Using 
their input, MSET identified and addressed minor integration discrepancies and condensed 
the feedback to form a “Trade-off Analysis” tab to assist users in DER combination 
comparisons. The tool cleanup phase resulted in a surprising number of discoveries which 
were identified late and are addressed in the last section of this chapter.  
1. Trade-off Analysis Development 
A major stakeholder critique was that the tool was not able to provide meaningful 
comparison information to the user. Each DER setup needed to be created and run 
separately and the outputs manually compiled for comparison. Spiral 4 of the MSET tool 
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provided analysis results and charts for a single set of DER ratings. With the recommended 
3,000 iteration run, the Monte Carlo simulation in Excel for each DER combination had a 
runtime of up to 2 hours. Once the simulation was complete, the user had to manually copy 
the simulation outputs to a separate sheet and then begin the process over again providing 
a different DER rating combination. After completion of the desired combinations, the user 
would then manually generate a graph from all the collected outputs to compare the 
resilience and cost results across the desired DER combinations.  
To aid the base energy manager in the decision-making process, MSET automated 
and condensed the time-consuming manual process to simplify the calculation and display 
of the relationship between various DER rating combinations, resilience, and cost. The 
MSET tool’s “Trade-off Analysis” tab allowed the user to choose three different DER 
rating combinations for a single disruptive event. Although the ELMI score takes into 
consideration four disruptive events from the resilience model, MSET reduced the scale of 
the calculation to consider a single disruptive event. MSET’s rationale for this decision 
was twofold. Firstly, each disruptive event is fairly unique for each base. For example, in 
California, the most common disruptive events are wildfire and earthquakes; a user would 
assess microgrid resilience for the most likely event for their base location. Secondly, the 
lengthy runtime required for Excel to calculate an ELMI score was excessive, an MI score 
for a single disruptive event has a much shorter run time.  
Three DER combination sets were created for a hurricane scenario at 2,000 
iterations, see Table 13, to test the “Trade-off Analysis” tab functionality.  




The “Trade-Off Analysis” tab automatically generated data tables and column 
charts to display the resilience differences (both MI and Resilience score) between DER 
rating combinations at different maintenance levels upon completion of the simulations, 
see Figure 25 for graphs using the Mission Impact as the resilience metric. 
 
Figure 25. Mission Impact versus Maintenance versus Cost 
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Figure 26. Resilience Score versus Maintenance Level versus Cost 
The graphs in Figures 25 and 26 also feature cost comparisons of the DER 
combinations on the right y-axis. Each line represents the NPV of a DER combination as 
calculated by the “Cost Model (NPV)” tab. The cost differences among the combinations 
are so close because the generator cost tables are rough in granularity—at the DER scaling 
entered, there was no significant increase in cost between the provided generator sizes. The 
resilience score and MI were both displayed so the team could ensure resilience metric 
correlations between two different models and matched the team’s expectations. As 
expected, the results matched: as the DG power rating rose, MI decreased, the resilience 
score increased, and costs increased. The MSET tool successfully performed individual 
testing for each spiral and thus proceeded to the final verification and validation testing for 
the whole MSET tool. 
2. Verification and Validation 
Final verification and validation testing were deemed a necessary final step for the 
MSET tool despite extensive testing between each integration to ensure the integrity and 
functionality of the final tool build. In order to verify the MSET model as a whole, test 
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cases were conducted and analyzed to ensure results continued to correlate with 
expectations and the originating model results. To keep this report publicly releasable, data 
from a naval station air terminal was modified and randomized to avoid any For Official 
Use Only (FOUO) concerns. The team continued to use the Air Terminal Microgrid Design 
Preliminary Report as initial test values that the results of testing were compared against. 
The report outlined the most preferred power rating combination of DG, PV, and BESS for 
Rota. MSET took these preferred power ratings as the nominal configuration for the final 
verification and validation, as seen in the first column of Table 14.  
The nominal case was expanded into three test cases to further examine how 
resilience changed in light of differing maintenance levels, through the “User Interface” 
tab. MSET ran a Monte Carlo simulation against the nominal case with maintenance levels 
of none, low, and medium expecting results to indicate a clear correlation between the 
increase of maintenance level and an improvement in resilience. The ELMI resilience 
metric was calculated using output results from the Monte Carlo simulation in the 
Resilience model, where a subjective mission impact score is multiplied by the number of 
hours the load was unmet. Table 14 shows the calculated resilience results. 
Table 14. Nominal Test Cases 
Nominal Case 
DER Rating (PV/ BESS/ DG) Maintenance Level ELMI Resilience Score 
0.3 / 0.8 / 0.32 None 13349.2 0.6468 
0.3 / 0.8 / 0.32 Low 11279.6 0.6610 
0.3 / 0.8 / 0.32 Medium 7854.2 0.6937 
 
Table 14 illustrates that when the maintenance levels were increased, it resulted in 
a decrease in ELMI and an increase in resilience score indicating an overall improved 
microgrid resilience. When the maintenance level switched from none to low, the resilience 
score increased by 2.1% percent and ELMI was reduced by 15.5%. When the maintenance 
level increased from low to medium, the resilience score increased by 3.3%, and ELMI 
decreased by 30.4 %. Lastly, when the maintenance level is changed from none to medium, 
the resilience score increased by 4.7% and ELMI was reduced by 41.2%. Table 14 results 
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illustrated a strong correlation between maintenance level and resilience and an inverse 
correlation between ELMI and both maintenance level and resilience. 
MSET constructed a set of test cases that examined relationships between DER 
rating, resilience metric, and cost in the “Trade-off Analysis” tab which proved the 
expected correlations. To cover the permutations of DER ratings, MSET created seven test 
cases by doubling and halving the nominal DER ratings. Table 15 highlights the DER 
modifications with PV changes in yellow, BESS in green, and DG in blue. 
Table 15. Trade-off Test Cases 
Test Case PV (MW) BESS (MW) DG (MW) 
Nominal 0.3 0.8 0.32 
PV 
0.6 0.8 0.32 
0.15 0.8 0.32 
BESS 
0.3 1.6 0.32 
0.3 0.4 0.32 
DG 
0.3 0.8 0.64 
0.3 0.8 0.18 
 
Each of the DER variations were run on the Trade-Off tab for a hurricane event at 
5,000 iterations for all of the maintenance levels. The team intended to use this table of test 
cases to confirm the MSET tool functionality and determine which DER asset had the 
greatest impact on microgrid resilience. However, the MSET model outputs did not match 
expectations. The graphs shown in Figures 27 and 28 are the results from the half DG and 
double DG power ratings runs.  
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Figure 27. Unexpected Outcomes of ELMI 
 
Figure 28. Unexpected Outcomes of Resilience Score 
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Resilience improved as expected due to the increase in DG size from half to 
nominal, as seen in Figure 27. However, there was very little improvement, sometimes 
even a reduction in microgrid resilience was observed when the DG capacity was increased 
from nominal to double, as seen in Figure 27 and Figure 28. These output results were 
concerning, as they seemed to indicate something wrong with the resilience model. Further 
investigation with the original tool developer and SMEs suggested that the test cases’ DER 
ratings were oversized for the load demand, and the number of iterations were too low. The 
data set generated for the MSET demo had an average demand load of 138KW, with a 
maximum load of 238KW for the month of December. The microgrid DER rating 
combinations were resized to be closer in scale to the load, see Table 16. 
Table 16. Test Cases with Various DER Ratings 
Test Case PV (MW) BESS (MW) DG (MW) 
Nominal 0.1 0.1 0.1 
PV 
0.2 0.1 0.1 
0.4 0.1 0.1 
BESS 
0.1 0.2 0.1 
0.1 0.4 0.1 
DG 
0.1 0.1 0.2 
0.1 0.1 0.4 
 
The number of iterations was increased to 8,000 at the suggestion of Anderson to 
account for the exponential distribution of the Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) utilized in 
the resilience score calculation. Once the suggestions were incorporated, the team 
attempted the two qualitative test cases shown in Table 17. The results of these test cases 
indicated that there was still an underlying issue with the resilience score calculation.  
Table 17. Test Cases Proving Resilience Calculation Issues for PV and BESS 




Does the resilience go up as the 
PV power ratings go up? 






Does the resilience go up as the 
BESS power ratings go up? 






Inconsistencies were noted as the power ratings were increased separately for each 
DER. Based on the literature review, the expectation was that whenever there was an 
increase in DER power rating, the microgrid’s resilience would increase. After running 
Monte Carlo simulations for each DER power rating, only changes in the DG’s power 
rating matched expectations. Test cases that increased the power ratings for PV or BESS 
resulted in a lower resilience score, which was opposite from what was expected. As shown 
in Figure 30, PV rating increases resulted in a decrease in resilience score for almost all 
combinations, which was inconsistent with how the system should behave. The PV rating, 
however, increased using the MI resilience metric, seen in Figure 29, and continued to 
behave as expected.  
 




Figure 30. PV Resilience Score Inconsistencies 
In Figure 30, apart from Combinations 1 and 2 at no maintenance, every increase 
in PV rating resulted in a decrease in resilience score. Despite incorporating suggestions 
from the original Resilience tool developer, these results continued to indicate an issue with 
the resilience score. Additional discussions and testing prompted adjustments with 
inconclusive results. Due to fears of inducing unexpected errors, the final decision was to 
leave the resilience score functionality in place for future improvement, but to remove the 
graphical display of the resilience score to avoid confusing the users with inconsistencies. 
This was applied to both the “Trade-off Analysis” tab, but also to the “User Interface” tab.  
During discussions with the Resilience Model developer, it was also determined 
that in order to see proper resilience trending, the input DER ratings had to be limited for 
the resilience calculation to function properly. Anderson recommended that the sum of the 
DG, PV, and BESS power ratings be 1.5 times the average load for the month being 
analyzed. Although not ideal, limiting the DER sizes to lower ratings still allowed users to 
observe important trends and relationships between DER rating, maintenance level, 
resilience, and cost. However, it means that the DER ratings determined suitable on the 
“User Interface” tab cannot be used on the “Trade-Off Analysis” tab as the team originally 
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hoped. This limitation was applied for test cases shown in Table 18 with the resilience 
score graph removed.  
Table 18. Spiral 5 Test Cases 







Does the cost increase when the 
maintenance level increases? 




Does the trade-off analysis graph 
reflect the decrease in mission 
impact when the maintenance 
level and DER rating increases? 






For the first test case in Table 18, the tool was checked to determine if the costs 
increased with an increase to the maintenance level. The tool displayed the correct results; 
the cost NPV increased as more maintenance was performed. During the second test case, 
the maintenance level and DER rating were increased, and the mission impact decreased 
(improved resilience), as expected. The team was careful to test these scenarios with the 
other DERs and not just the DGs as the DGs tended to show falsely correct responses across 
both resilience metrics. All of the test cases outlined in Table 12, 14, and 15 were re-run to 
ensure that removing the resilience outputs did not affect mission impact results. All final 
MI test results were compared to the initial MI test results to ensure that the excision the 
of resilience score did not have an effect on the MI resilience metric results. The team 
concluded the tool integration was complete. 
3. Overall Cleanup 
Cleanup of the MSET tool was initially focused was on the “User Interface” tab 
and improvements to the end-user output displays. Insights from potential users were taken 
into consideration and the NPV and MI for each maintenance level were displayed on the 
“User Interface” tab for additional reference. The user has the ability to select a single 
iteration and generate accurate costs for the microgrid for each maintenance level. If more 
accurate ELMI data is desired, the user can select a greater number of iterations. 
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The “Data” tab was reorganized for easier understanding. Data tables used to run 
the models that are either default or user modifiable are housed in this tab. The solar 
irradiance table was removed from the “Power Flow” tab and inserted into the “Data” tab, 
providing a single location for all user modifiable inputs.  
During the development of the case study, the team realized that results were easier 
to illustrate by adding a fourth DER combination. The intent of the trade-off analysis was 
to observe changes in resilience and cost when individual DER ratings were modified. By 
allowing four combinations, users can establish a baseline configuration as Combination 1 
to be compared against the other three combinations. The first combination is manually 
populated by the user with DER ratings that are approximately 50% greater than the 
average load for the month. Utilizing combination 1 as a baseline, the following three 
combinations illustrate the resilience and cost metric changes associated with increases or 
decreases in individual DER ratings. The new “Trade-off Analysis” tab layout is shown in 
Figure 31. 
  
Figure 31. Four Combination Final “Trade-off Analysis” Tab 
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In the example shown in Figure 31, increasing the DG size and keeping the 
maintenance level at “Low” provides the best return on investment. If funding is of no 
concern, increasing DG size at a medium maintenance level results in the greatest resilience 
improvement. The cost of Combination 4 is almost identical to the cost of Combination 1 
(lowest cost) and has the better resilience metrics.  
The final MSET cleanup incorporated the removal of the limit lie show in Figure 
20, this was replaced with the microgrid capacity line show in Figure 32. The microgrid 
capacity line was added to allow the user to see if the DER ratings entered will be able to 
support the critical load. 
 
Figure 32. Microgrid Capacity Line 
If the microgrid output shown in blue is above or matched with the load line shown 
in orange, this indicates that the microgrid is able to support the load. Figure 32 shows a 
sample of microgrid that is unable to support the load in areas where the orange exceeds 
the blue capacity line. 
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4. Development Summary  
Development of the MSET tool was deemed complete after five spirals. The team 
chose the power flow model as a starting point because it was the least complex of the 
available models and would provide a solid foundation for further integration. The user 
input sheet facilitated the user experience by consolidating all necessary inputs and 
highlighted outputs according to the user’s interests. The resilience and cost models were 
complex enough that MSET incorporated the entirety of each tool to avoid inducing 
unknown errors. Integration focused on the simplified core of each of the models by 
unlinking or manually zeroizing unused functions while leaving the full capability of the 
original models intact for possible future expansion.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS, FUTURE WORK, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
Chapter V presents conclusions, future work, and recommendations. A tool 
demonstration will be presented in a separate case study analyzing an actual naval 
instillation microgrid. A User Guide will accompany the MSET tool to aid users in their 
own analysis of a microgrid.  
A. CONCLUSION 
The MSET tool provides base energy managers a single integrated system design 
methodology to evaluate microgrid energy needs and potential trade-offs using Microsoft 
Excel. The team established a scope, CONOPS, and a detailed stakeholder analysis 
followed by research and literature reviews of relevant microgrid work exploring near peer 
research from EE, resilience, and cost analysis standpoints using available commercial and 
government sources focusing on, electrical architecture, resilience, and cost.  
MSET utilized the ICSM process for the development of the tool. The ICSM 
process framework provided the necessary flexibility for the successful development of the 
MSET project. By focusing on incremental commitment and accountability, the process 
allowed the team to focus on accumulation of understanding throughout development, then 
incorporating the lessons learned and decisions made to the next spiral, each of which fully 
incorporated a major functional addition to the tool. The process led MSET to create five 
separate functional prototypes that satisfied the operational concept and stakeholders 
The MSET tool began development with the power flow model to assess if the 
microgrid configuration was able to meet the load requirements. The integration of a user 
input sheet facilitated the user experience by consolidating all necessary inputs and the 
highlights of the model outputs according to the stakeholder interests. Once the integration 
was complete and tested MSET turned to the more complex resilience model. The first 
attempt at integrating Anderson’s resilience model by removing extraneous features was 
met with failure. Instead, MSET integrated the entirety of the resilience model into the tool 
to reduce the risk of introducing errors. Integrating the entire tool leaves room for 
incorporation of unused features for future growth. Once the resilience model was 
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integrated, MSET turned to Anderson’s cost model; at the time, the cost model was the 
only available model that would add new capability to the MSET tool. The cost model 
integration was low risk because it was already incorporated with the resilience model. By 
the time the integration of Anderson’s cost model was complete and tested, Hildebrand had 
completed his NPV cost model. MSET decided to incorporate the NPV cost model because 
it provided a different cost perspective in terms more familiar for the base energy managers. 
During the integration, the discovery was made that the resilience score produced by the 
resilience model was not compatible with the NPV cost model. To remedy the problem, 
Peterson’s ELMI calculation was incorporated, using data from the resilience model. 
Finally, MSET developed a novel trade-off analysis method between DER ratings, 
microgrid costs, and resilience. The trade-off analysis portion of the tool provides valuable 
trend data to aid the user in making decisions that impact the base’s ability to better 
accomplish its mission in compliance with the SECDEF energy security intent. Each 
prototype was an extension of the previous iteration, building on prior work based on 
evidence-based risk and opportunities discovered during the development cycle of the 
previous iterations.  
The MSET tool provides a preliminary evaluation analysis but is entirely dependent 
on user interpretation of the requirements and constraints of the installation. The tool is 
useful to provide generalized recommendations based off observed trends. The purpose of 
the integrated tool is to provide the end user the ability to determine the correct sizing and 
DER distribution to support load demand based on user requirements and restrictions to 
meet each user’s specific circumstance. Throughout the development, testing of the tool, 
and case study, DGs appeared to provide the best return on investment while having the 
greatest positive impact on resilience.  
MSET successfully created a functional tool that integrated existing EE and SE 
microgrid analysis models. The MSET tool provides base energy managers the ability to 
assess a microgrid, observe the effects of changing power ratings, and compare the trade-
offs between cost and resilience. This tool is a functional prototype that will serve as a solid 
foundation for future development and expansion for microgrid analysis needs. 
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B. FUTURE WORK AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Throughout the development of this tool, MSET observed gaps that could provide 
important value to the user if further investigated and developed. Due to a combination of 
time constraints and project scope, the team was unable to address these gaps, but took note 
of them for future investigation. The following sections outline potential avenues for future 
investigation in the improvement of the microgrid analysis tool.  
1. Resilience Score Anomaly 
During the verification and validation (V&V) of the fifth spiral, MSET identified 
occasional anomalous results for the resilience score. The resilience score analysis graphs 
in the “Trade-off Analysis” tab indicated that the overall resilience of the microgrid was 
decreasing as the power rating for the BESS and PV increased, which is in direct conflict 
with the MI resilience graphs. The unexpected results were discussed in detail in Chapter 
IV.E.2 of this technical report. MSET determined that the most logical path forward to 
meet schedule deadlines was to remove the resilience score from the “Trade-off Analysis” 
tab and rely exclusively on the MI resilience data. 
2. Capability to Change Microgrid Architecture 
Adding the ability to select or change the microgrid architecture, such as adding 
more PV, DG, or ESS in the initial setup, would improve the capabilities of the tool and 
enable it to more accurately represent the microgrid being considered. The MSET tool only 
considers a single microgrid architecture consisting of a single PV, DG, and BESS, which 
allows for the user to change the energy rating of the DERs and compare the MI of differing 
rating configurations after a particular disturbance occurs. Utilizing a single architecture 
simplifies the initial analysis of the microgrid by allowing the user to observe the changes 
in cost and resilience per type of DER. In addition to changing the architecture options, the 
team also recommends adding the ability to add different DER sources, such as wind 
turbines and nuclear energy sources. The addition of different DER sources can better aid 
base energy managers in considering microgrid options. 
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3. Runtime Efficiency 
Runtime issues were encountered during V&V testing due to the Monte Carlo 
simulation. As the number of iterations increased, Excel processing inefficiencies drove 
the runtimes into multiple hours, tying up computers and making testing a longer process 
than anticipated. It may be possible to make improvements to VBA code to improve 
efficiency; however, adding further complexity may require a move to a more powerful 
programming language such as Python to resolve issues with time efficiency.  
4. DER Ratings 
The MSET tool’s trade-off analysis is limited to DER ratings that meet 1.5 times 
the average load. If the DER ratings are much higher than 50% of the average load for the 
selected month, the output data is not accurate and cannot be used to infer resilience trends. 
The DERs are so large compared to the load that the resilience calculation no longer 
matters. Comparing changes to DER ratings no longer holds any value because the system 
is already oversized and thus sufficiently resilient. Since the trade-off analysis only works 
when DER ratings are 50% greater than the average load, the necessary baseline DER 
ratings rarely meet peak load demands. This issue could potentially be solved with the 
addition of load profile and shedding capabilities in the tool, which would in turn allow for 
the tool to simulate a microgrid that changes its output based on the demand, however 
further investigation is warranted.  
5. Load Profiles and Load Shedding  
An advantageous expansion is to investigate is the ability to break the single load 
profile into its constituent parts for finer granularity. The team expects that breaking the 
load profile into criticality categories (mission impact range or building type), would allow 
for a more comprehensive tool. The ability to apply an MI score to the categorized loads 
will provide a more accurate assessment of resilience. Additionally, once the data is broken 
down into mission impact categories, the tool would have the ability to scale specific loads 
by criticality priority. The load shedding investigation will have to take into account if the 
increased fidelity provides enough value to explore in depth.  
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Load shedding is an important energy management feature as it identifies and 
prioritizes critical and non-critical loads. Load shedding implementation is only applicable 
to the tool once the tool has developed features for multiple architectures and multiple load 
profiles; however, load shedding could be an interesting avenue to explore in terms of how 
an energy manger may approach the design of a microgrid, as well as how the changes in 
load demand may affect resilience. The introduction of load shedding would expand 
opportunities for users to explore more complex combinations of architecture and loads, 
but it will be difficult to balance the user interface complexity to ensure it does not 
overwhelm the intended users.  
6. Energy Management Strategy 
Further exploration of the energy management strategy used across the MSET tool 
is recommended. The models MSET used for integration already had embedded energy 
management strategies that could not be modified without adverse effects on the tool. 
However, differences between the tools internal and unique energy management strategies 
may cause inherent disconnects between individual tool outputs. Due to inconsistencies, 
the “Resilience” and “Trade-off Analysis” tabs are not directly correlated with the “Power 
Flow” model. An effort should be made to determine the individual energy management 
strategies employed by each model and bring the strategies into alignment with each other 
to increase the interoperability of the MSET tool. 
7. Varying Confidence Intervals 
Interviews with stakeholders suggested that the base energy managers may desire 
a different confidence interval than 95% used in the MSET tool. Providing the flexibility 
to adjust the confidence interval will allow the stakeholders to implement a confidence 
interval that is more applicable to the respective situation and should be a fairly simple 
addition. 
8. Comparing Multiple Disturbances for Mission Impact  
In earlier iterations, the MSET tool executed and analyzed different disturbances 
(fire, earthquake, hurricane, and cyber-attack) and compared the four mission impact 
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scores in one execution. Executing the tool for multiple disturbances consequently caused 
the run time to increase significantly. To reduce the run times, the tool was reduced to 
executing and observing one disturbance at a time. Translating the MSET tool to a more 
powerful programming language could enable this capability without compromising 
efficient run times. Future iterations of the tool may provide the capability to run all the 
applicable disturbances to the microgrid and execute them in one run for an ELMI in the 
trade-off analysis 
9. Location-Based Simulation  
The ability to automate the PV characteristics database such that an end user could 
input their location to update the PV table for the selected geographic area would greatly 
enhance the usability of the tool. The MSET tool’s power flow model calculates PV ratings 
based on the month selected. In the current setup, the PV output data is locked to Spain. 
The MSET team found out while writing the user guide that the solar irradiance data used 
to generate the PV sine wave in the power flow model is not as easily adjusted for different 
geographic areas as was initially thought. It was not possible to correct this issue, because 
the discovery was found in the late stages of the project. A discussion with the developer 
of the PV sine wave in the power flow model brought to light that a significant amount of 
trial and error went into the development of the initial PV curve. This does not translate 
into a clean-cut procedure for future end users. MSET has identified two possible paths 
forward: manually adjust the PV curve for each new geographic area or plot the PV output 
data from NREL or the Photovoltaic Geographical Information System instead of using the 





The following section explains the four supplemental materials available in 
conjunction with this work. Those interested in obtaining the first two public release 
supplementals can use the link available with the main thesis’s catalog entry in the NPS 
Institutional Archive Calhoun. To access the remaining two restricted supplementals, 
please contact the NPS library. 
 
Supplemental 1 (User Guide):  
This user guide is meant to explain the microgrid analysis tool (MSET tool) and 
provides detailed usage instructions. The guide establishes detailed explanations for the 
tabs, specific cells, functions, and provides clarification on interpretation as well as 
standard operating procedures. This is a public release document. 
 
Supplemental 2 (MSET Tool): 




This supplemental is a case study for the methodology and the usage of the MSET 
tool. This is a restricted documented. For those interested in obtaining the supplemental 
document for review, please contact the NPS Dudley Knox Library.  
 
Supplemental 4:  
This supplemental is the MSET Excel file that is associated with the case study. 
This is a restricted documented. For those interested in obtaining the supplemental 
document for review, please contact the NPS Dudley Knox Library.  
84 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
85 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
[1]  “Energy policy of the Department of Defense,” 10 U.S. Code § 2911, 2019 
Online]. Available: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/2911 
 
[2]  R. E. Giachetti, C. J. Peterson, D. L. Van Bossuyt, and G. W. Parker, “Systems 
engineering issues in microgrids for military installations,” INCOSE International 
Symposium, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 731–746, Jul. 2020, doi: 10.1002/j.2334-
5837.2020.00751.x.  
 
[3]  D. T. Ton and M. A. Smith, “The U.S. Department of Energy’s Microgrid 
Initiative,” The Electricity Journal, vol. 25, no. 8, pp. 84–94, Oct. 2012, doi: 
10.1016/j.tej.2012.09.013. [Online]. Available: https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/
retrieve/pii/S1040619012002254 
 
[4]  R. Lasseter, A. Akhil, C. Marnay, J. Stephens, J. Dagle, R. Guttromsom, A. S. 
Meliopoulous, R. Yinger, and J. Eto, “Integration of distributed energy 
resources,” Lawrence Berkeley National Lab., Berkeley, CA (United States), 
Rep.--50829, 799644, Apr. 2002 [Online]. Available: http://www.osti.gov/
servlets/purl/799644-dfXsZi/native/ 
 
[5]  C. Marnay and O. C. Bailey, “The CERTS microgrid and the future of the 
macrogrid,” Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. Berkeley, CA (United States), 
Berkeley, CA (United States), Rep.-55281, Jun. 2004 [Online]. Available: 
https://www.osti.gov/biblio/833951 
 
[6]  P. Siritoglou, “Distributed energy storage design and modeling to improve the 
energy security of naval facilities,” M.S. thesis, Dept. of Systems Engineering., 
NPS, Monterey, CA, USA, 2019 [Online]. Available: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/
62817 
 
[7]  “2016 DOD operational energy Strategy” Office of the Assistant Secretary of 




[8]  A. Hirsch, Y. Parag, and J. Guerrero, “Microgrids: A review of technologies, key 
drivers, and outstanding issues,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 
90, pp. 402–411, Jul. 2018, doi: 10.1016/j.rser.2018.03.040.  
  
86 
 [9]  J. D. Hunt, B. Zakeri, G. Falchetta, A. Nascimento, Y. Wada, and K. Riahi, 
“Mountain Gravity Energy Storage: A new solution for closing the gap between 
existing short- and long-term storage technologies,” Energy, vol. 190, p. 116419, 
Jan. 2020, doi: 10.1016/j.energy.2019.116419.  
 
[10]  T. Armistead, “How alternative storage solutions are breaking into the lithium-




[11]  P. Asmus, A. Forni, and L. Vogel, “Final Project Report, Microgrid Analysis and 




[12]  C. J. Peterson, “Systems architecture design and validation methods for microgrid 
systems,” M.S. thesis, Dept. of Systems Engineering., NPS, Monterey, CA, USA, 
2019 [Online]. Available: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/63493 
 
[13]  D. M. Buede and W. D. Miller, The Engineering Design of Systems: Models and 
Methods. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, Wiley-Blackwell, 2016.  
 
[14]  “Definitions,” 10 U.S. Code § 101, 2006 [Online]. Available: h
 ttps://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/101 
 
[15]  “Engine-driven generator systems for prime,” Unified Facilities Criteria, UFC 3–
540-01, Aug. 2014 [Online]. Available: https://www.wbdg.org/FFC/DOD/UFC/
ufc_3_540_01_2014_c2.pdf 
 
[16]  “3-Pillars of energy security,” Washington DC, P-602, 2018. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.navfac.navy.mil/ 
 
[17]  N. Yodo and P. Wang, “Engineering Resilience Quantification and System 
Design Implications: A Literature Survey,” J. Mech. Des, vol. 138, no. 11, Nov. 
2016, doi: 10.1115/1.4034223.  
 
[18]  D. L. DeAngelis, “Energy Flow, Nutrient Cycling, and Ecosystem Resilience,” 
Ecology, vol. 61, no. 4, pp. 764–771, Aug. 1980, doi: 10.2307/1936746. [Online]. 
Available: https://esajournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.2307/1936746 
 
[19]  W. Anderson, “Resilience assessment of islanded renewable energy microgrids,” 
Ph.D., dissertation, Dept. of Systems Engineering., NPS, Monterey, CA, USA, 
2020. [Online]. Available: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/66574    
 
87 
[20]  M. Panteli, D. N. Trakas, P. Mancarella, and N. D. Hatziargyriou, “Power 
Systems Resilience Assessment: Hardening and Smart Operational Enhancement 
Strategies,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 105, no. 7, pp. 1202–1213, Jul. 2017, 
doi: 10.1109/JPROC.2017.2691357.  
 
[21]  Z. Li, M. Shahidehpour, F. Aminifar, A. Alabdulwahab, and Y. Al-Turki, 
“Networked Microgrids for Enhancing the Power System Resilience,” 
Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 105, no. 7, pp. 1289–1310, Jul. 2017, doi: 10.1109/
JPROC.2017.2685558.  
 
[22]  C. W. Zobel, “Representing perceived tradeoffs in defining disaster resilience,” 
Decision Support Systems, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 394–403, Jan. 2011, doi: 10.1016/
j.dss.2010.10.001.  
 
[23]  K. Anderson, E. Hotchkiss, and C. Murphy, “Valuing Resilience in Electricity 
Systems,” National Renewable Energy Laboratory, p. 3 [Online]. Available: 
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy19osti/74673.pdf 
 
[24]  N. Judson, A.L. Pina, E.V. Dydek, S.B. Van Broekhoven, and A.S. Castillo, 
“Application of a Resilience Framework to Military Installations: A Methodology 
for Energy Resilience Business Case Decisions,” Massachusetts Institute Of 
Technology, Technical Report 1216, Oct. 2016 [Online]. Available: 
https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/IE/TR-1216.pdf 
 
[25]  “Mission Dependency Index.”  [Online]. Available: https://www.assetinsights.net/
Glossary/G_Mission_Dependency_Index.html 
 
[26]  E. Kujawski and G. Miller, “The Mission Dependency Index: Fallacies and 
Misuses,” INCOSE International Symposium, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 1565–1580, 
2009, doi: 10.1002/j.2334-5837.2009.tb01035.x.  
 
[27]  R. Fish, “Design and modeling of hybrid microgrids in arctic environments,” M.S 




[28]  C. W. Keesee, “Realizing energy security on a DOD installation using 
photovoltaics with a battery energy storage system,” M.S Thesis, Dept. of 
Systems Engineering., NPS, Monterey, CA, USA, 2018 [Online]. Available: 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/58321 
 
[29]  J. Paniagua Sánchez-Mateos, Reliability-Constrained Microgrid Design. 2016 
[Online]. Available: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-187715 
 
88 
[30]  C. Petri, “Assessing the operational resilience of electrical distribution systems,” 
M.S. thesis, Dept. of Systems Engineering., NPS, Monterey, CA, USA, 2017.  
 
[31]  J. Salmeron, R. K. Wood, and R. Baldick, “Optimizing electric grid design under 
asymmetric threat,” Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, Technical 
Report, 2003 [Online]. Available: https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/733 
 
[32]  “Distributed Energy Resources Customer Adoption Model Plus (DER-CAM+),” 
Intellectual Property Office, 25-Mar-2016. [Online]. Available: 
https://ipo.lbl.gov/lbnl2016-075/ 
 
[33]  “Microgrid design guide,” Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Washington 
Navy Yard, NAVFAC P601, Dec. 2016.  
 
[34]  J. Hildebrand, “Estimating the life cycle cost of microgrid resilience” M.S. thesis, 
Dept. of Systems Engineering, NPS, Monterey, CA, USA, 2020 [Online]. 
Available: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/66658    
 
[35]  B. S. Blanchard and W. J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis, 5th ed. 
786 [Online]. Available: https://www.pearson.com/us/higher-education/program/
Blanchard-Systems-Engineering-and-Analysis-5th-Edition/PGM222930.html 
 
[36]  T. Hathaway, “Value Energy Resiliency for the U.S. Military: A Formula,” 
Microgrid Knowledge, 01-Jul-2019. [Online]. Available: 
https://microgridknowledge.com/value-energy-resiliency-military/ 
 
[37]  F. Rusco and B. J. Lepore, “Improved guidance needed for analyzing and 
documenting costs and benefits,” DOD Renewable Energy Projects, Report to 
Congressional Committees GAO-16-487, Sep. 2016 [Online]. Available: 
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-487  
 
[38]  B. Boehm and R. Turner, “The incremental commitment spiral model (ICSM): 
principles and practices for successful systems and software,” in Proceedings of 
the 2015 International Conference on Software and System Process,  New York, 
NY, USA, 2015, pp. 175–176, doi: 10.1145/2785592.2785619.  
 
[39]  “Department of Defense Risk, Issue, and Opportunity Management Guide for 
Defense Acquisition Programs.” Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 




[40]  G. Oriti, D. Lorio, B. Anderson, J. Enriquez, D. L. Van Bossuyt, R. Giachetti, and 
D. Nussbaum, “Air terminal microgrid design preliminary report,” Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Sep. 2020.  
89 
 
[41]   W. Anderson, “Microgrid Excel Model Q&A,” 28-Oct-2020 [Online]. Available: 
https://outlook.office.com/mail/ 
 
[42]  D. Beaton, “Testing whether distributed energy storage results in greater 
resilience of microgrids,” M.S. thesis, Dept. of Systems Engineering, NPS, 
Monterey, CA, USA.  
 




[44]  J. Hildebrand, “Cost information RE: Microgrid Excel modeling,” 11-Dec-2020 
[Online]. Available: https://outlook.office.com/mail/ 
  
90 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
91 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
